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Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
AIDS: Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. AIDS is characterized by 
reduced immune system function and the presence of “opportunistic 
infections”—illnesses that the healthy human body can fight off, but that 
AIDS patients cannot due to their suppressed immune system. Individuals 
with HIV develop AIDS when their immune system function drops below a 
certain threshold.  
 
HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus. HIV was identified as the cause of AIDS 
around 1985. It is most commonly transmitted by blood, semen, and 
mucus. 
 
MPHT: Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing.  
 
IDPH:   Illinois Department of Public Health.  
 
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
 
FDA: Food and Drug Administration.  
 
AMA: American Medical Association.  
 
WHO: World Health Organization.  
 
ELISA: Enzyme-linked Immunosorbent Assay. The ELISA test was the simplest 
and most commonly used test to check for HIV.  
 
Western Blot: The Western Blot test was a more complicated and expensive follow-up 
test to the ELISA test. It was used to confirm HIV-positive status if two 
ELISA tests returned positive results.  
 
False positive: A false positive is when a diagnostic test (like the ELISA test) returns a 
positive result, but the patient does not actually have the disease. False 
positives (and the corresponding problem of false negatives) are a 
common problem with diagnostic tests.  
 
Contact tracing:  Contact tracing is a public health program in which individuals with a 
transmittable disease report all people to whom they could have 
transmitted their infection. Public health workers find these individuals and 
test them for the infection, and then repeat the procedure.  
 
AZT:   Ziduvodine. The earliest treatment for HIV, licensed in 1987.
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Introduction 
 Illinois Representative Ralph Barger was not happy. He supported a bill to mandate 
premarital HIV testing in Illinois, and he could not understand why the health department did not. 
With sarcasm, he explained his frustration: 
The Illinois Department of Public Health supported [the bill] by one percent. We think 
that’s a fantastic thing for a bureaucracy whose responsibility is to protect the health of 
the people of the State of Illinois. The U.S. News and World Report were 77 percent in 
favor of [similar legislation]…Wall Street Journal’s opinion poll was 82 percent in favor of 
protecting the people.1 
 
In a different political climate, Barger’s critique might have seemed illogical. Why back a public 
health program when only 1% of the public health bureaucracy supported it? But in 1987, 
Barger made perfect sense. The people supported mandatory premarital HIV testing (MPHT); 
therefore, MPHT was good public health policy. By not supporting MPHT, the Illinois 
Department of Public Health (IDPH) failed its duty “to protect the health of the people.”  
As written in Illinois, MPHT ordered Illinois couples to take an HIV test no more than 90 
days before their marriage and share their results with each other. On the surface, MPHT 
seems like sound public health policy. HIV is a sexually transmitted infection, and marriage 
implies a lengthy sexual relationship with another person. As the governor of Illinois put it: 
“People getting married ought to know.”2 Upon closer inspection, though, flaws with MPHT 
become apparent. In the midst of the early AIDS epidemic (1981-1990), funding for AIDS 
prevention was extremely limited, and the vast majority of people with HIV were gay men or 
injection drug users—neither of whom often got married. MPHT would identify relatively few 
HIV-positive people at very high cost. In addition, public health experts had concerns about HIV 
test accuracy and confidentiality. They worried that MPHT might increase the stigma and 
discrimination that people with HIV already experienced. 																																																								
1 85th General Assembly House of Rep. Transcription Debate, May 19, 1987, 143.  
2 Tim Franklin, “Senate Approves AIDS Testing For Couples Planning to Marry,” Chicago Tribune, June 
28, 1987.  
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Unfortunately, public health AIDS expertise garnered little respect in 1987, both in Illinois 
and across the United States. Skepticism of AIDS expertise grew especially rapidly in Illinois 
after an insensitive AIDS education campaign that wasted political capital and destroyed 
already-waning public confidence. Illinois Representative Penny Pullen, the strongest proponent 
of MPHT, further fanned the flames by publicly denouncing the IDPH and focusing pointed 
attacks on its director, Dr. Bernard Turnock. A devout evangelical Christian, she promoted 
repressive measures like mandatory testing and transmission criminalization as a solution to the 
epidemic, which her colleagues in the Illinois General Assembly accepted.3 With Illinois public 
health officials discredited, elected officials managed to justify and pass MPHT in September 
1987. In implementation, Illinoisans belatedly realized that MPHT would inconvenience them, 
cost a great deal of money, and accomplish little. Faced with the real-life consequences of 
MPHT, public support of the legislation reversed, leading to political turnaround and a swift 
repeal of the legislation in September 1989. Without the shift in public support, it is unlikely that 
MPHT would have been repealed, because public health officials never regained their credibility. 
 This thesis will argue that Christian morality, fear of AIDS, and mistakes on the part of 
public health officials intensified already-powerful medical distrust in Illinois, which made it 
possible for MPHT to pass. Economic factors and the burden of testing on Illinois couples 
caused the legislation’s repeal. This introduction will provide a brief overview of the early U.S. 
AIDS epidemic and medical distrust. The first chapter will situate MPHT in the context of the 
early AIDS epidemic and examine the ways that fear, medical distrust, and a failed Illinois public 
health education program empowered the Illinois General Assembly to act against AIDS. The 
second chapter will analyze arguments for and against MPHT, demonstrate that the legislation 																																																								
3 Transmission criminalization refers to policy that made it a crime to transmit AIDS. Specifics of these 
policies varied from state to state (many states passed them), but in Illinois, anyone who knew of their 
HIV-positive status who engaged in any behavior that could transmit HIV could be charged with a felony 
and serve 7.5 years in prison.  
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had serious problems, and explain how medical distrust made it possible to justify MPHT. The 
third chapter will narrate MPHT’s implementation, identify the causes of its repeal, and discuss 
its consequences for medical distrust. The conclusion will offer a modern perspective on AIDS 
and consider the ways that medical distrust continues to hinder the U.S. AIDS response.  
 
AIDS: Infancy to Infamy 
AIDS was first mentioned on June 5, 1981 in the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. The CDC provided case studies of 
“5 young men, all active homosexuals” who had a rare form of pneumonia “almost exclusively 
limited to severely immunosuppressed patients.” After providing further details and requesting 
information from readers, the report concluded: “The occurrence of pneumocystosis in these 5 
previously healthy individuals without a clinically apparent underlying immunodeficiency is 
unusual.”4 “Unusual” was an understatement. Medical researchers reading between the lines 
realized that serious trouble was afoot, especially because no one knew anything about it.5 By 
the time of publication, two of the patients had died.  
Within a year, the “unusual” illness received a name—acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS)—and researchers confirmed that it was a new disease.6 AIDS had its name, 
but there remained much to discover: its cause, transmission, fatality rate, risk groups, cure, 
vaccine, and progression. A year later, doctors identified human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 
the cause of AIDS.7 Now they faced new pressure. The media had realized that AIDS was 
newsworthy, and particularly after the death of actor Rock Hudson from AIDS in 1985, the 																																																								
4 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Pneumocystis Pneumonia—Los Angeles,” MMWR 30.21 
(June 5, 1981): 1-3.  
5 Randy Shilts, And The Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987), 68-75.  
6 Ronald O. Valdiserri, Dawning Answers: How the HIV/AIDS Epidemic Has Helped to Strengthen Public 
Health (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28-9.  
7 Ibid.  
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coverage became inescapable. By the end of 1985, 72% of Americans reported having heard or 
read three or more stories on AIDS in the past week, and the evening newscasts of major 
networks covered an average of twenty AIDS stories per month.8 Ninety-nine percent of 
Americans had heard of the disease, and in cities, 10-20% of residents reported knowing 
someone with it.9 Within four years, the number of American AIDS diagnoses had grown from 
five to twelve thousand.10  
The increase in media coverage brought public awareness, but it also caused fear and 
stigma. Americans were terrified of the new illness and deeply judgmental of people infected 
with it. Much of AIDS’ stigma came from the American patients whom it afflicted first: gay men, 
closely followed by injection drug users. Initially named Gay-Related Immune Deficiency, AIDS 
never escaped its early relationship with homosexuality and drug abuse.11 For many, the 
epidemic was a moral one, and positive HIV status became associated with an array of socially 
condemned traits and behaviors. Americans viewed HIV-positive people with terror, but also 
with disgust. People with HIV—or people suspected of having HIV, like gay men and sex 
workers—experienced ostracism and abuse. Restaurants refused to serve them; doctors 
refused to treat them; emergency services in several major cities began wearing masks and 
gloves in case they came in contact with people with HIV.12 Children with HIV were hounded 
from their schools, adults with HIV lost their jobs.13 The public wanted a solution to AIDS, and 																																																								
8 Eleanor Singer, Theresa Rogers, and Mary Corcoran, “The Polls—A Report: AIDS,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 51 (1987): 582; Kinsella, Covering the Plague, 4.   
9 Singer, Rogers, and Corcoran, “The Polls—A Report: AIDS,” 581. 
10 Erin Ruel and Richard Campbell, “Homophobia and HIV/AIDS: Attitude Change in the Face of an 
Epidemic,” Social Forces 88.4 (June 2006): 2167. 
11 Lawrence Gostin, The AIDS Pandemic: Complacency, Injustice, and Unfulfilled Expectations (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), xix-xxi.  
12 Ibid, 2167-8; A Closer Walk, documentary, directed by Robert Bilheimer (2003; Worldwide 
Documentaries, 2003), film; Jon Van and Ronald Kotulak, “Doctors Averse to AIDS Care: Survey,” 
Chicago Tribune, June 5, 1987.  
13 Jan Crawford, “Schools Bar Child With AIDS Virus,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 30, 1987; Michael Closen 
et al., “AIDS: Testing Democracy – Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need for 
Privacy in Serologic Testing,” John Marshall Law Review 29.4 (Summer 1986): 837. 
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they wanted it fast. Unfortunately, doctors began to suspect that a cure or vaccine could be a 
long time coming. 
 
The Rise of Doctor Evil 
AIDS arose at a unique time in the history of medicine. After centuries of relatively slow 
progress, medical discovery and innovation burst forth in the first half of the 20th century. 
Starting with Louis Pasteur’s development of germ theory in 1864, achievements like X-rays 
(1895), insulin (1921), antibiotics (1940), blood-typing (1945), open-heart surgery (1953), and 
vaccines for diphtheria (1923), pertussis (1926), tetanus (1927), tuberculosis (1927), influenza 
(1945), yellow fever (1953), and polio (1955) made enormous improvements to human life 
expectancy and quality of life. American doctors and public health officials attained an 
unprecedented level of prestige and respect. Federal and state governments provided steady 
financial and legislative support of their work, spending generously on medical research and 
mandating (and funding) water fluoridation and chlorination, dietary fortification, and school 
vaccinations.14  
After 1960, however, the medical establishment began to lose its trusted place in the 
eyes of the American public. The days of the family doctor were over, replaced with impersonal 
specialists. In its climb to brilliance, medicine had become unknowable and inaccessible to 
outsiders.15 In addition to the new distance between doctor and patient, Americans learned of 
problems with professional greed and research ethics throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The 
American Medical Association’s campaign against Medicaid/Medicare seemed in bad taste to 
many Americans, particularly against a backdrop of sky-high physician salaries and 																																																								
14 John C. Burnham, “American Medicine’s Golden Age: What Happened to It?,” Science 215.19 (March 
1982): 1474.  
15 David J. Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical 
Decision Making (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 128, 137. 
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pharmaceutical costs.16 After the news of the Sloan-Kettering cancer scandal (1963) and the 
Tuskegee syphilis study (1972), the public reacted with disgust and outrage. “Trustworthy” 
researchers had injected elderly Jewish patients with cancerous cells without their consent and 
allowed hundreds of poor black men to suffer preventable syphilis so they could observe them.17 
In the wake of these revelations, civil rights leaders decried medicine’s exploitation and 
mistreatment of racial minorities.18 Feminist scholars critiqued the paternalism of the doctor-
patient relationship—particularly in the treatment of female patients—and called for increased 
protection of patient rights and autonomy.19 Ordinary Americans started to question doctors’ 
ethics and motives.20  
 
AIDS and Medical Distrust 
AIDS gave new dimensions to this medical distrust. Prior to the epidemic, Americans’ 
concerns centered on health care workers’ ethical standards and motives.21 AIDS made 
Americans doubt health care workers’ abilities, too. As AIDS perplexed researchers, Americans 
wondered if researchers knew anything about the disease. AIDS took on a reputation as the 
disease that stumped medicine, proof that pride goes before a fall.22 AIDS also changed the 
type of health care worker that was perceived as most distrustful. Before AIDS, physicians and 
medical researchers bore the brunt of the distrust, while public health workers escaped relatively 
																																																								
16 Burnham, “American Medicine’s Golden Age: What Happened to It?,” 1475-8.  
17 John A. Osmundsen, “Many Scientific Experts Condemn Ethics of Cancer Injection,” New York Times, 
Jan. 26, 1964; Jean Heller, “Syphilis Victims in U.S. Study Went Untreated for 40 Years; Syphilis Victims 
Got No Therapy,” New York Times, July 26, 1972.  
18 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, 10.  
19 Ibid, 142-4.  
20 Burnham, “American Medicine’s Golden Age: What Happened to It?,” 1475-8; Steven Epstein, Impure 
Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 7.  
21 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, 247-9.  
22 Epstein, Impure Science, 7, 15-6. 
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unscathed.23 With AIDS, medical researchers weathered criticism from HIV-positive people, 
particularly the gay community, but public health officials shouldered more of the blame from the 
general public.24  
Perhaps the most fascinating consequence of AIDS on medical distrust was how it 
changed the coalition calling for medical reform and the nature of those reforms. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, medical distrust came largely from the left: feminists and civil rights leaders, with 
legislative reforms sponsored by Democratic politicians like Senator Ted Kennedy.25 Their 
demands focused on regulation. They called for increased oversight on research ethics and 
drug approval and new means for patients to seek reparations for medical malpractice.26 In the 
AIDS epidemic, medical distrust continued to come from the left, led by gay men, but now the 
bulk of the criticism came from the right.27 Critics on the right attacked public health workers’ 
competence and credibility, and accused health officials of softening their response to the 
epidemic in order to protect gay men from discrimination. They called for a return to repressive 
public health measures like quarantine and mandatory testing, which had been phased out 
throughout the twentieth century because public health officials found them ineffective and 
burdensome to patients.28 Despite their skepticism of health workers’ competence and 
credibility, conservative critics sought a return to increased public health police power—against 
health workers’ wishes.  
																																																								
23 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, 247-9.  
24 Epstein, Impure Science, 10-14; Ronald Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS and the 
Politics of Public Health (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 117.   
25 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, 10, 66, 142-4.  
26 Ibid, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health Office for Protection 
from Research Risks, Part 46—Protection of Human Subjects, 1966.  
27 Gay men’s criticism of the medical establishment largely focused on medical research, particularly its 
slow pace. Conservative critics, on the other hand, targeted public health workers. For an overview of gay 
men’s attack on the medical establishment, I recommend Epstein’s Impure Science. 
28 Gostin, The AIDS Pandemic, xxv; James Colgrove and Ronald Bayer, “Manifold Restraints: Liberty, 
Public Health, and the Legacy of Jacobson v Massachusetts,” American Journal of Public Health 95.4 
(April 2005): 572.   
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AIDS sharpened medical distrust and directed it at the doctors, researchers, and 
especially the public health officials working on the epidemic. AIDS policy was the most 
disastrous product of that medical distrust. As a frightened and distrustful public clamored for 
answers, policymakers sought to make decisions that satisfied voters, medical experts, and 
their own beliefs. As medical distrust grew, public health advice held less and less sway. 
Conservative Christians, in particular, fought back against the recommendations of public health 
on AIDS. Perhaps because of traditional Christianity’s long-held skepticism of secular expertise, 
some Christians were uniquely willing to challenge medical expertise.29 In addition, social 
changes at the time of AIDS, like the rise in cohabitation, divorce, single-parent families, and 
acceptance of gay men and lesbians disturbed conservative Christians.30 They believed that 
American morality stood on unsteady ground, and AIDS was another sign that the country 
approached disaster. As a result, their outlook on the epidemic was fundamentally different from 
that of the public health establishment. While public health officials viewed AIDS as a disease in 
need of treatment, conservative Christians interpreted it as a warning about the evils of 
homosexuality, drug use, and premarital sex, using the disease as evidence for their own 
argument.31 This perspective had major effects on their proposed solutions to the epidemic, 
many of which directly contradicted the recommendations of public health. The Helms’ 
Amendment on sex education, the federal needle-exchange ban, and the HIV immigration ban 
are several examples of conservative Christians’ response to the epidemic.32 MPHT is another.   
 																																																								
29 Randall Stephens and Karl Giberson, The Anointed: Evangelical Truth in a Secular Age (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press, 2011), 7-10, 35.   
30 Ibid, 14-5; Ruel and Cambell, “Homophobia and HIV/AIDS,” 2171-3; Andrew Cherlin, “The 
Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage,” Journal of Marriage and Family 66 (November 2004): 849.   
31 Elizabeth Fee and Manon Parry, “Jonathan Mann, HIV/AIDS, and Human Rights,” Journal of Public 
Health Policy 29.1 (April 2008): 54-5; Anthony Petro, After the Wrath of God: AIDS, Sexuality, and 
American Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2-6.  
32 The Helms Amendment on sex education passed in 1987. It banned the use of federal funds for any 
program that encourages sexual activity, whether heterosexual or homosexual.  
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Why MPHT? 
MPHT is absent from the historic record. Lawyers, epidemiologists, and political 
scientists have studied it in passing, usually as a footnoted example of policy gone wrong. 
Lawrence Gostin and Ronald Bayer both mention the Illinois bill in several works, but with little 
more than a paragraph summarizing the law and its subsequent repeal.33 The public health 
community has provided the most detailed assessment of the Illinois program, with several high-
profile articles in the Journal of the American Medical Association and the Journal of American 
Public Health.34 These articles are not historical accounts. Written by statisticians, they give a 
cursory explanation of the law, followed by a slurry of numbers used to declare it a failure. It is a 
shame that the Illinois MPHT law has been reduced to footnotes and statistical figures, because 
it has much to say about American medicine, religion, and policymaking.  
The decision to focus on MPHT, as opposed to some other AIDS measure, is 
unconventional. MPHT was not the most controversial AIDS program passed during the early 
epidemic. It did not garner the outrage that programs like contact tracing or mandatory sex 
offender testing did.35 MPHT is unusual (and was less controversial at the time) because it dealt 
with a population detached from the early epidemic: married American heterosexuals. Most 
accounts of the early American AIDS response focus (rightfully) on the experience of gay men, 																																																								
33 Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences, 145; Ronald Bayer, “Public Health Policy and the AIDS 
Epidemic: An End to HIV Exceptionalism?” New England Journal of Medicine 324.21 (May 1991); 
Lawrence Gostin and William Curran, “AIDS Screening, Confidentiality, and the Duty to Warn,” American 
Journal of Public Health 77.3 (March 1987); Gostin, The AIDS Pandemic, 160. 
34 Lyle Petersen and Carol White, “Premarital Screening for Antibodies to Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Type 1 in the United States,” American Journal of Public Health 80.9 (Sept. 1990); Jack McKillip, “The 
Effect of Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing on Marriage: The Case of Illinois,” American Journal of Public 
Health 81.5 (May 1991); Bernard Turnock and Chester Kelly, “Mandatory Premarital Testing for Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus: The Illinois Experience,” Journal of the American Medical Association 261.23 
(June 1989).   
35 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 7-8. Contact tracing is a public health program in which HIV-positive 
individuals are compelled to list their sexual/drug partners, who are contacted by public health officials, 
tested, and if positive, undergo the same program. Mandatory sex offender testing was a program in 
which any person accused—not convicted—of a sexual offense was tested for HIV. If positive, their status 
was shared with the assaulted party.    
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with the remaining attention given to injection drug users and racial minorities, who were also 
seriously affected by the epidemic.36 Analyzing MPHT requires focus on the heterosexual 
majority, because they were the supporters and the target population of the legislation. When 
gay men and injection drug users enter the story, it is only to discuss how the heterosexual 
majority viewed them, and to argue that MPHT harmed them through misdirection and neglect.  
Nonetheless, Illinois’ attempt at MPHT deserves attention. It encapsulated many of the 
themes of the heterosexual experience of AIDS and serves as an example of policymaking 
failure. It raised questions about marriage, sexual relations, public health police powers, stigma, 
and the relationships between religion, government, and experts. Many of these elements recur 
throughout American history and continue today. Although most American heterosexuals 
avoided the effects of the epidemic, they were keenly aware of it, and their opinions on the 
epidemic steered policy. With MPHT, the heterosexual majority used marriage to make a 
powerfully exclusionary statement directed at people with HIV, which added to the stigma that 
people with HIV already faced.37 Understanding the heterosexual majority’s perspective on 
AIDS is crucial to understanding the American response to the epidemic.  
In addition, it is curious that Illinois was one of two states to pass MPHT. Similar 
proposals were considered in thirty-five states that year, but Illinois and Louisiana were the only 
two to pass them, and Louisiana repealed its law within six months.38 Studying the intricacies of 
Illinois politics at the time helps to explain which factors contributed to this doomed policy and to 
identify similarities between MPHT and other bad policymaking decisions.  																																																								
36 For examples of these accounts, consider Petro, After the Wrath of God; Randy Shilts, And The Band 
Played On; Paul Monette, Borrowed Time: An AIDS Memoir (New York: Harvest Books, 1998); Perry 
Halkitis, The AIDS Generation: Stories of Survival and Resilience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013); Andrew Holleran, Chronicle of a Plague, Revisited: AIDS and Its Aftermath (Boston: Da Capo 
Press, 2008). 
37 Priscilla Yamin, American Marriage: A Political Institution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012), 3-10.  
38 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 8. Most discussion of the Louisiana legislation is lumped in with Illinois, 
because the Illinois legislation lasted longer.  
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MPHT demonstrated the ways that medical distrust crippled the U.S. response to AIDS. 
Although this thesis focuses on Illinois, similar debates about the competence and 
trustworthiness of medical experts occurred across the national stage, with similarly disastrous 
consequences.39 The discussion of the U.S. AIDS response usually identifies homophobia and a 
particular interpretation of Christian morality as the primary obstacles to the fight against AIDS. 
Using the smaller lens of MPHT, this thesis argues that medical distrust also played a powerful 
role in hindering effective solutions to AIDS. Despite the enormous medical strides made 
against AIDS since then, the skepticism of medical expertise (and the resultant policies) 
continues today and has reverberated in other debates about public health policy: water 
fluoridation, school vaccination, substance abuse, and gun violence, to name a few.   
The story of MPHT sheds light on the AIDS epidemic—a subject that, for all its historical 
and social importance, is surprisingly understudied by historians. AIDS left an indelible mark on 
Americans’ understanding of illness, medicine, homosexuality, stigma, sex, blame, and their 
own mortality. Even though the hysteria and attention surrounding the early epidemic have 
subsided, most Americans recognize the disease’s name. Therefore, it is surprising that 
historians have had so little to say about it. Few historical accounts of the U.S. AIDS epidemic 
exist. Those that do generally focus on the global pandemic or strictly on the scientific progress 
against the disease, rather than its enormous social, political, and cultural implications.40 
Journalists, political scientists, and public policy researchers have provided most of the 																																																								
39 George Curry, “Reagan: No Law Barring AIDS Bias,” Chicago Tribune, Aug. 3, 1988; Associated Press, 
“Florida Considering Locking Up Some Carriers of the AIDS Virus,” New York Times, Jan. 27, 1988; 
Tamar Lewin, “Rights of Citizens and Society Raise Legal Muddle on AIDS,” New York Times, Oct. 14, 
1987.  
40 For examples of these accounts, consider Mirko Grmek’s History of AIDS: Emergence and Origin of a 
Modern Pandemic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), Victoria Harden’s AIDS at 30: A History 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012), and Jonathan Engel’s The Epidemic: A Global History of AIDS 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 2006). Some examples of the few historical analyses of the U.S. 
AIDS epidemic include Anthony Petro’s After the Wrath of God, Jennifer Brier’s Infectious Ideas: U.S. 
Political Responses to the AIDS Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), Epstein’s 
Impure Science, and James Gillett’s A Grassroots History of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in North America 
(Spokane: Marquette Books, 2011). 
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commentary on the American AIDS epidemic, along with several gay men who wrote personal 
memoirs of the experience.41 All of these authors bring important perspectives on the epidemic. 
However, none can completely fill the role of historians in dissecting and understanding the 
impact of AIDS in the United States.  
By overlooking the AIDS epidemic, historians deprive it of context and assessment. 
Where are the comparative analyses of Margaret Thatcher and Reagan’s responses to the 
epidemic; the discussions of the American media’s portrayal of past epidemics, AIDS, and 
epidemics today; the study of the 1920s syphilis epidemic and its impact on the policy response 
to AIDS? It is often said that those who ignore history must relive it, a pithy remark that has 
been made horrifically true in the American response to the epidemic. By failing to analyze AIDS 
from a historical perspective, we allow the mistakes of the early epidemic to continue.  
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“Education about HIV needs to occur both inside and outside of our nation’s schools and 
workplaces. No corner of society can be neglected as educational programs about the HIV 
epidemic are developed and implemented.” 
 
-  Report of the Presidential Commission on the  
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, 19881 
 
Chapter One 
The Early Illinois AIDS Response, July 1985-April 1987 
Hobart, Indiana: Sandy Fischer watched from her sitting room window as her husband, 
Eugene, battled the armed intruder. Eugene wrenched the gun from the robber’s hands, and a 
shot was fired. The thief bit Eugene on the arm. Eugene, unfazed, subdued his attacker and 
settled in to wait for the police.   
 When the police arrived, they found an interesting note in the robber’s pocket. The 
intruder, David Scott, was a hemophiliac who had been diagnosed with AIDS only days prior at 
a hospital in Chicago. While the police carted Scott away, Eugene and Sandy rushed to the 
hospital to have the bite examined. Sandy was distraught. She had read about AIDS and knew 
that it was fatal. Was it transmissible via biting? She did not know, but she feared for Eugene’s 
life. By the time they reached the hospital, she had become so upset that she had to take a 
heavy sedative while doctors reassured the couple that the bite was unlikely to cause any 
harm—no more chance of AIDS than if Eugene had eaten in the same restaurant as an AIDS 
patient. Four hours later, Sandy had a seizure and fell into a coma. She died shortly thereafter. 
The doctors believed that an interaction between the sedative and Sandy’s low potassium levels 
caused her death. Eugene, left a widowed father of two, swore that the shock of the AIDS bite 
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had killed her. Jack Crawford, the Indiana prosecuting attorney, concurred, and he promised to 
charge Scott with felony murder in addition to attempted murder.2  
 During the early AIDS epidemic, stories like this one flooded American newspapers and 
broadcasts. For most Americans, it caused fear and uncertainty about the disease, its 
transmission, and its prevention.3 Could biting spread AIDS? Kissing? Swimming pools? Did 
AIDS kill everyone it infected? Could heterosexual people get AIDS? Researchers eventually 
answered all of these questions and more, but particularly at the beginning, the answers 
appeared unclear.4 Hysteria and a deep skepticism of scientists’ knowledge of the disease 
resulted. With neither national leadership nor clear medical guidance on the subject, the public 
viewed AIDS as a major threat and demanded action.5   
 In Illinois, the situation was no different. Sandy and Eugene Fischer’s story featured in 
the Chicago Sun-Times, and local newspapers covered an AIDS story nearly every day.6 Illinois 
state senator Aldo DeAngelis (R-Olympia Fields) reported that, even while out getting dinner, 
“the biggest single question that comes up is what are we doing about the AIDS issue,” and that 
his constituents wanted to send AIDS patients “to a leper island.”7 Illinois legislators felt 
enormous pressure to do something about the AIDS epidemic. However, they did not know what 
would be most effective. At least in the early epidemic, they forced themselves to stay back and 
supported the Illinois Department of Public Health’s educational campaign, the recommended 
approach.   
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 The Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) had troubles of its own. Staff members 
struggled to craft an educational program that would reach state residents, educate them about 
the disease, change their behavior, and not offend any sensibilities. On this last goal, the IDPH 
failed: their program scandalized the public and, more importantly, the policymakers. The Illinois 
General Assembly had already expressed skepticism about the educational approach, and the 
IDPH program seemed to justify all of their doubts. Now more than ever, they felt compelled to 
demonstrate to their panicked constituents that they could take on AIDS. Medical distrust, fear 
of AIDS, and frustration with the IDPH’s failed educational approach all contributed to an 
Illinoisan political situation that demanded more aggressive action against AIDS.  
 
An Uphill Battle 
 By the end of 1985, the AIDS epidemic had taken hold. Epidemiologists estimated that 
more than half of the gay men living in New York City and San Francisco were infected, and in 
New York City, one in sixty-one babies born was delivered by a mother with HIV.8 It became 
increasingly apparent that funding for AIDS research and prevention was inadequate, 
particularly for prevention. The Institute of Medicine’s 1986 report, “Confronting AIDS: Directions 
for Public Health, Health Care, and Research” recommended a minimum annual expenditure of 
$1 billion for AIDS research and an additional $1 billion annually for AIDS education and 
prevention activities. 9 Federal expenditures in 1986 formed about an eighth of that 
recommendation, putting the onus on state coffers and private benefactors.10  
 Despite the limited funding, scientific progress on AIDS continued. Luc Montagnier of the 
Pasteur Institute had identified the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in May 1983, and in 																																																								
8 Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences, 12.  
9 Valdiserri, Dawning Answers, 8-9. 
10 Judith Johnson and Sharon Coleman, “AIDS Funding for Federal Government Programs: FY1981-
FY2005,” Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 21, 2004, 8.  
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April 1984, Robert Gallo of the National Cancer Institute proved that HIV caused AIDS. In 
addition, Gallo’s laboratory created an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test for 
antibodies to HIV, allowing them to identify exposed individuals.11 In March 1985, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) licensed the ELISA test and a more stringent follow-up test, the 
Western Blot. American blood banks immediately began screening the blood supply, and the 
CDC released funding in April to establish anonymous antibody testing sites.12 Anticipation of 
the test was high, with 75% of gay men reporting that they planned to take it once available.13 In 
response, Margaret Heckler, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, ordered all cities to 
provide anonymous HIV testing centers to meet demand.14 The creation of the ELISA test 
increased optimism about AIDS. For public health professionals, the ELISA test was the 
diagnostic tool they had been looking for—a way to identify individuals at risk and attempt to 
change their behavior.15 For policymakers, the ELISA test was an objective scientific technique 
that would combat the illness and reassure the public.16 Both of these perspectives alarmed 
individuals at risk of HIV, particularly the gay community. With the ELISA test, the government 
had a way to prove infection status, but no one knew what it would do with this information. The 
gay community worried that the development of the ELISA test would complicate the lives of 
HIV-positive people more than it would help them.17   
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A Difficult Start in Illinois 
 Chicago led the Illinois AIDS response. As the largest city in Illinois, it had high numbers 
of injection drug users and a gay community of about 160,000 men.18 At the end of 1985, the 
IDPH reported more than 350 cases of AIDS in Illinois, 92% of them in the Chicago area.19 Gay 
and bisexual men comprised nearly 90% of those afflicted, and more than half had already 
died.20 Estimates suggested that 40% of Chicago’s gay population and 20% of the city’s 
injection drug users could be infected with HIV, and that in total, 1% of Chicagoans were 
infected.21 Compared to the epidemics in San Francisco and New York City, Chicago was doing 
fairly well, but public health workers braced themselves for worse. Research suggested that the 
number of AIDS cases would double every ten months, meaning that things could quickly get 
out of hand. 22 The IDPH estimated that by 1990, Illinois would have 10,000 AIDS cases, whose 
care would cost about a billion dollars.23   
 The Chicago AIDS response had not started smoothly. In 1982, the Chicago Health 
Department established the Chicago AIDS Task Force, to create a plan and allocate resources. 
The Task Force’s initial approach to the epidemic antagonized the gay community, the primary 
focus of their efforts. 24 Traditionally, public health officials had controlled epidemics by 
monitoring cases and tracking the illness’ spread. Therefore, the IDPH made AIDS a reportable 
disease and created a surveillance system to track cases in 1983.25 When Heckler called for 
anonymous testing sites in 1985, the Chicago Health Department (unsuccessfully) petitioned 
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against her, arguing that anonymity ran counter to public health objectives. The Chicago Health 
Department believed that tracking infected patients was crucial to the fight against the 
epidemic.26 However, as public health practitioners soon realized, the aggressive approach 
alienated a frightened and suspicious gay community. The idea of a database of names that 
could be used for blackmail or violence horrified many gay men, who had only recently escaped 
total social ostracism. They conceded that the ELISA test could help to combat AIDS, but they 
refused to surrender their hard-won privacy and liberty for a slightly more effective public health 
strategy.27 The IDPH and Chicago Health Department eventually reversed their tactics, but the 
damage done early in the epidemic never completely healed. Chicago’s gay men learned “to 
avoid the sneers of staffers at the Chicago Public Health clinics,” and accused the IDPH of 
“snooping into everybody’s closet [while] other AIDS needs will go unaddressed and 
unfunded.”28 Rather than working with the gay community, the Chicago Health Department and 
IDPH too often found themselves at odds with it. 
 The state response to the AIDS epidemic came later, partially because of political 
upheaval. Governor James Thompson fired the Illinois Director of Public Health late in 1984 
amidst a milk contamination scandal, and it took several months to find a replacement. By 
January 1985, he had selected Bernard Turnock, a young doctor with a wealth of public health 
experience.29 Turnock had served in the IDPH as director of emergency medical services and 
as director of the maternal-child health program, in addition to working in the New York City 
Health Department and as commissioner of the Chicago Department of Health. 30 Described by 
his colleagues as an “outstanding public health physician” with a keen mind and good work 
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ethic, Turnock was ready to take action against AIDS. 31 Shortly after taking office, he helped 
Thompson establish the AIDS Interdisciplinary Advisory Council, headed by Dr. Renslow Sherer 
of Cook County Hospital in Chicago.32 Thompson asked the Council to make policy 
recommendations for handling the AIDS epidemic. In summer 1986, their work came to fruition 
when the Illinois legislature approved $2.3 million for AIDS expenditures. With that money, the 
IDPH created an AIDS Activity Section, which started work in January 1987, and opened more 
than 60 HIV testing centers and an AIDS hotline.33 Six years after the recognition of the disease 
and nearly 1,000 Illinois AIDS cases later, Illinois had the bare bones of bureaucracy necessary 
to combat the epidemic.34 
 As its first objective, the IDPH AIDS Activity Section decided to assess knowledge about 
the epidemic in Illinois. In early 1987, the IDPH surveyed Illinois adults on their knowledge of 
AIDS. To their surprise, most Illinoisans knew a great deal about AIDS and its transmission, but 
more than 75% of them admitted that they had not changed their behavior to protect themselves 
from the disease. The IDPH had found its first priority: prevention education.35  
 
An Education on Education 
 The concept of health education was still new. Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
did the importance of prevention and health behavior rise in prominence, after medicine had 
exhausted its supply of magic bullets like antibiotics, vaccines, and surgery. 36 Chronic illnesses 
like cardiovascular disease and cancer were the new killers, and doctors struggled to develop 
easy fixes. When researchers recognized smoking as a cause of cardiovascular disease and 																																																								
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cancer in the 1950s, public health practitioners finally began to study the use of education as a 
preventative “cure.”37   
Creating effective educational programs proved a complex challenge. Hard science had 
traditionally distanced itself from its softer relatives, and public health researchers had to 
familiarize themselves with the sociological, psychological, and educational research on human 
behavior and education.38 In addition, much of the available social science research lacked 
experimental rigor. As two physicians observed, “The scientific basis for effective health 
education approaches is not as sound as we would like; its status probably reflects, at least in 
part, the heavy emphasis on research in the biological rather than the social sciences over the 
last many decades.”39 Theories on effective education and the nature of human behavior 
abounded, but few had been tested, making it difficult to differentiate between fact and 
hypothesis.40 Public health officials would attempt an educational intervention, only to find it 
useless, prompting a switch to a new one. Such trial-and-error interventions consumed 
resources and time.   
As AIDS continued to resist attempts at vaccines and cures, the medical community 
decided that the best approach was to educate patients about prevention. Early AIDS 
educational materials probably did more harm than good. Unsure of how to inform the public, 
health officials opted to use fear as an educational tool, hoping that it would inspire viewers to 
change their behavior. As they quickly realized, the approach was largely ineffective at behavior 
modification, but it did terrify the public. These early educational efforts reminded viewers that 
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AIDS was fatal and gruesome, transmissible, and pervasive, increasing the already-high level of 
hysteria about AIDS.41  
Furthermore, because of President Ronald Reagan’s silence on the disease and the 
limited funding for education, public health practitioners and the CDC often had to rely on the 
media as AIDS educators.42 Although usually better than nothing, the media made scientific 
errors in their reporting and, more frequently, put extensive focus on uncertain scientific findings 
that later proved to be false. These two factors combined to give Americans a vague but 
petrifying knowledge of the disease, along with a suspicion that scientists were lying or, worse, 
secretly clueless about the illness.43 Neither encouraged a calm public response to the epidemic 
or lasting behavioral change.   
 Throughout 1985, newspapers screamed imminent catastrophe. LIFE’s cover 
announced: “Now No One Is Safe From AIDS,” while the Chicago Tribune declared: “AIDS 
‘Surprise’ Forces Medicine To Face Its Limitations.”44 Journalists reported that up to one-third of 
American AIDS cases resulted from heterosexual contact (in reality, the percentage was closer 
to 1%) and blamed the “AIDS minorities [that] are beginning to infect the heterosexual, drug-free 
majority.”45 In Chicago, the biggest AIDS doom-crier was probably Bob Greene, a columnist for 
the Chicago Tribune. In a single column, he described the epidemic as “a national plague,” “the 
plague of the millennium,” and swore that “you couldn’t conceive of a disease that would be 
more disruptive and disturbing than this one.” As for the potential of medicine, Greene was 
pessimistic: “Virtually all of the news is bad. For example, at first it was widely reported that 
AIDS could not be spread via kissing—only via more intimate sexual contact. Health 
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professionals are no longer so sure.”46 Media accounts like these increased fear of AIDS and 
doubt about scientists’ ability to stop it.   
 In the media’s defense, medical research on AIDS changed constantly, further 
complicating educational efforts and making public suspicion understandable. Early in the 
epidemic, epidemiologists blamed party drugs for the disease—but then later realized that it was 
sexually transmitted. It took several more years for researchers to recognize blood as a mode of 
infection, and the same for mother-to-child transmission.47 It also took time for researchers to 
recognize the role of HIV in AIDS. Initially, doctors did not know if all AIDS patients had HIV. 
Once they understood that HIV caused AIDS, it was unclear if all HIV patients would go on to 
develop AIDS. Early estimates suggested that 10% of HIV cases would develop into full-blown 
AIDS, then 20-30%. Today, research has shown that nearly 100% of HIV cases become AIDS if 
left untreated.48 Scientific uncertainty and backtracking is part of the research process: 
contradictory findings are published over many years until scientists reach consensus. However, 
science is rarely subject to the intense public scrutiny and urgency that characterized the AIDS 
epidemic. To those outside of the scientific community, AIDS research appeared sloppy and did 
not inspire confidence. The public had not expected scientific discovery to be a process of trial 
and error, and they found it difficult to convince themselves of the integrity of medical research 
after observing the unpolished reality.49 Distrust of the medical profession increased.  
HIV stigma interacted with medical distrust to give it a darker undertone: the belief that 
the liberal medical intelligentsia was deliberately concealing the true means of HIV transmission 
in order to protect HIV-positive individuals. If researchers revealed that saliva transmitted HIV, 
quarantine would be the only way to stop the spread of infection. As a result, some believed that 																																																								
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researchers preferred to lie rather than expose HIV-positive individuals, who were normally 
some combination of gay, racial minority, or injection-drug user, to repressive public health 
programs. Accusations of so-called “HIV exceptionalism” damaged medical credibility and 
increased hostility against individuals with HIV.50 HIV stigma fueled medical distrust, which 
further compounded HIV stigma.  
To the modern observer, these conspiracy theories seem ludicrous. However, public 
health practitioners did sometimes stretch the truth about AIDS. Early in the epidemic, 
researchers recognized that the apathy about AIDS stemmed from societal distaste for those 
most frequently afflicted: gay men, injection drug users, and sex workers.51 Public health 
practitioners feared that these groups could be shunned or worse for their connection to AIDS. 
They sought to motivate greater interest and involvement in the epidemic—and to silence 
demands for discrimination against AIDS patients—by portraying AIDS as a condition that could 
affect anyone.52 They succeeded. By 1987, the majority of Americans believed that AIDS would 
spread to the public at large.53 In reality, though, researchers knew from early in the epidemic 
that AIDS would not spread quickly through the American heterosexual community, because of 
the slowness of HIV transmission and mostly monogamous structure of American heterosexual 
adult life.54 The deception may have staved off the worst of the punitive HIV-control measures, 
but in the process, it heightened panic. By 1986, most Americans, like most Illinoisans, knew 
quite a bit about AIDS, but little about who to trust and what to do to protect themselves.   
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A Rare Spot of Sanity 
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop helped to answer those questions. Congress 
confirmed the Presbyterian pediatric surgeon in November 1981, amidst controversy over his 
pro-life beliefs and friendships with outspoken Christians like Francis Schaeffer and Phyllis 
Schlafly.55 Koop weathered criticism for his lack of public health experience, but he took to it 
with ease when working on the campaign against smoking.56 In the summer of 1985, he turned 
his attention to AIDS after Reagan appointed him to the National AIDS Task Force and asked 
him to prepare a report on the epidemic.57 Koop agreed, but most of the medical community had 
low expectations and assumed that his religious beliefs would color the report. Over the next six 
months, the Surgeon General visited patients, listened to testimonies, and met with doctors. 
Then, rather than delegate the task to a staffer, he began to write drafts of the report—twenty-
six of them—at a standing desk in his basement.58 He requested and received permission to 
skip the usual bureaucratic approval process for the report by arguing that the epidemic 
demanded urgency.59   
When Koop released the report on October 22, 1986, it was immediately apparent why 
he had stayed close-lipped about its contents. In a break from expectations and Reagan’s 
response to the epidemic, Koop took a frank and nonjudgmental approach to the disease. 
Balancing reassurance with realism, he wrote: 
Everyday living does not present any risk of infection. You cannot get AIDS from casual 
social contact. Casual social contact should not be confused with casual sexual contact 
which is a major cause of the spread of the AIDS virus. Casual social contact such as 
shaking hands, hugging, social kissing, crying, coughing or sneezing, will not transmit 
the AIDS virus. Nor has AIDS been contracted from swimming in pools or hot tubs or 
from eating in restaurants (even if a restaurant worker has AIDS or carries the AIDS 
virus). AIDS is not contracted from sharing bed linens, towels, cups, straws, dishes, or 																																																								
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any other eating utensils. You cannot get AIDS from toilets, doorknobs, telephones, 
office machinery, or household furniture. You cannot get AIDS from body massages, 
masturbation or any non-sexual body contact.60 
 
He outlined the primary modes of transmission, the spread of the disease thus far, and effective 
prevention methods, with photos and detailed diagrams. In addition, he arranged for the 
distribution of an informational AIDS pamphlet to every home in America, the largest public 
health mailing in U.S. history.61 In an editorial following the report, Koop declared:  
Many people—especially our youth—are not receiving information that is vital to their 
future health and well-being because of our reticence in dealing with the subjects of sex, 
sexual practices, and homosexuality. This silence must end. We can no longer afford to 
sidestep frank, open discussions about sexual practices—homosexual and 
heterosexual.62 
 
Rather than following the educational trend of fear and scare statistics about AIDS’ fatality and 
prevalence, Koop focused on prevention and safety, stressing that most Americans were not at 
risk of contracting HIV. Koop did declare that all Americans were susceptible to HIV, but he 
stated throughout that individuals who practiced safe sex and drug usage habits did not need to 
worry.63 He recommended thorough sex education starting in elementary school, with an 
emphasis on safe sexual practices.  
After the years of silence and uncertainty from the Reagan administration on the 
epidemic, Americans were relieved to hear information about the disease from a reputable, 
recognizable government authority.64 Nonetheless, the report sparked enormous outrage among 
the Reagan administration and his more conservative supporters. Up to that point, the Reagan 
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administration’s approach to AIDS prevention-based education had focused on abstinence and 
moral responsibility.65 Koop’s recommendations on proper condom usage and massages in lieu 
of sex did not fit well within that framework. Schlafly said that the report “looks and reads like it 
was edited by the Gay Task Force” and accused Koop of supporting “safe sodomy” education in 
the third grade.66 Journalist Randy Shilts remarked that after the release of the report, the 
administration “decided that Surgeon General C. Everett Koop had been brainwashed by 
militant homosexuals, and presidential aides roundly ignored his suggestions.”67 In publishing 
the report, Koop used up most of his political capital.   
These negative reactions reflected a broader American conservatism about sex. Most 
mainstream television channels (including those in Illinois) banned condom advertisements, and 
while Koop wrote his report, the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute making sodomy a 
criminal offense.68 Only two years later, the Senate would pass the Helms Amendment 98 to 2, 
denying federal funds to any organizations that “promote or encourage, directly, sexual activity, 
whether homosexual or heterosexual.”69 When the Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) released 
an educational video on AIDS which featured a condom demonstration using a banana, the 
International Banana Association sent a series of shrill letters to PBS, declaring “such usage of 
our product to be totally unacceptable,” accusing the network of “arbitrary and reckless 
disregard for the unsavory association that will be drawn by the public.”70  
Sex was still a deeply private subject, connected with religion, morality, and shame. By 
the 1970s and 1980s, sex education had become more common in American schools, but the 																																																								
65 Petro, After the Wrath of God, 69; “Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic,” 83.  
66 Petro, After the Wrath of God, 72.  
67 Shilts, And The Band Played On, 611-2.  
68 Steve Daley, “TV Barriers to Condom Ads Breaking Down,” Chicago Tribune, February 15, 1987; 
Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences, 7.  
69 Gostin, The AIDS Pandemic, xxv.  
70 Letter from Robert M. Moore to Bruce L. Christiansen, n.d., quoted in Melancholia and Moralism: 
Essays on AIDS and Queer Politics, Douglas Crimp (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), 67.    
	 31 
content had gaps. Most Americans learned about venereal disease and reproductive anatomy, 
but researchers estimated that less than 10% received formal education on contraception, 
venereal disease prevention, homosexuality, and sexual decision-making and communication.71 
 
Figure 1: Political cartoon in Richmond Times-Dispatch, 198872 
These oversights in sex education left many Americans uncomfortable and unprepared to 
discuss HIV prevention, adding to the stigma and uncertainty surrounding the disease.73 
Discomfort with sex created a powerful cycle: the shame surrounding sex meant that people 
struggled to talk about HIV, which added to the stigma of HIV, which further discouraged open 
communication about HIV—which added to HIV stigma. Many chose to say nothing at all, as if 
afraid that by discussing HIV prevention, they might expose themselves and their loved ones to 
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the disease. Fostering an open American discussion about HIV prevention was not for the faint-
hearted.    
 Although Koop’s report appalled leading Republicans, many Americans found it 
reassuring and agreed with Koop’s perspective. Polls estimated that 82% of Americans read the 
mailer, and in the weeks following its release, Americans increasingly supported sexual 
education—in November 1986, 70% of Americans favored sexual education with an explicit 
focus on condom usage and sexually transmitted disease.74 Koop may have lost all respect with 
the administration, but many Americans regarded him as a hero, and they were relieved to 
receive information on the disease from a trustworthy government source.75 Regardless, his 
bold effort was a bit late. By the time he released his report, AIDS hysteria was entrenched, and 
although he inspired confidence in medicine, he was one doctor, not the entire establishment. 
The Surgeon General’s remarks alleviated some of the panic, but the fear, medical distrust, and 
demands for aggressive action continued.  
 
The Facts For Life 
 Inspired by their alarming survey results and Koop’s call to educate the public, the Illinois 
Department of Public Health (IDPH) AIDS Activity Section decided to implement an AIDS 
awareness campaign. The campaign would take place over six months, with a kickoff week from 
April 20-25, 1987. Between January and April, IDPH employees prepared seminars and press 
releases for the media, a statewide newsletter, a state AIDS media resource center, and 
workshops for medical personnel. They arranged for celebrity spokespeople, drug abuse 
education sessions, and the distribution of more than 100,000 posters, brochures, and fact 
cards for the public. Finally, staffers developed plans for the opening week, events that would 																																																								
74 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 10; Singer, Rogers and Corcoran, “The Polls—A Report: AIDS,” 593.  
75 Stark, “Politics and AIDS,” 458; 85th Illinois General Assembly House of Rep. Transcription Debate, 
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engage the public and generate interest in prevention efforts. All told, the campaign, titled AIDS, 
Facts for Life, cost more than $600,000 ($1.3 million when adjusted for inflation).76   
The IDPH had to make careful choices throughout the planning process. Led by a 
Republican governor, they needed to keep the Republican constituency happy. Outside of 
Chicago, the state was still rural and conservative, and even within the city, there was a large 
Catholic population with firm opinions on sexual morality.  Chicago’s Catholic archbishop, 
Joseph Bernardin, had rejected attempts at condom advertising and sex education, arguing that 
he would not support choices for which the “immediate aim is good—the prevention of 
disease—but which implicitly or explicitly condone promiscuity.”77 At the same time, the 
education effort had to accomplish its main objective: education. As Tim Drake, leader of the 
Chicago Area Republican Gay Organization, observed: “While the gay community has been 
independently conducting an educational campaign about AIDS, the straight community has had 
to rely on supermarket tabloids for information.”78 The IDPH was eager to change that reality, 
but with caution. 
 On April 20, the campaign started with a bang. Health professionals, politicians, and 
celebrities gathered in Springfield to release two thousand balloons tagged with AIDS “Facts for 
Life” cards, to symbolize the spread of AIDS prevention information. The first of the medical 
workshops started well, and attendees were invited to listen to informative and funny AIDS 
songs composed for the occasion, performed by “Cats on Holiday,” over lunch.79 
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Figure 2: IDPH Poster from AIDS Awareness Week, 1987 
That was when things stopped going well. Among their playful songs, Cats on Holiday 
performed the “Condom Rag,” a jazzy tune that started off with “You say you want sex that’s 
safe and fun/Well jive with us, we’ll show you how it’s done,” and advised listeners to “avoid 
contact with bodily fluids/ Pardon the pun, it’s in the bag/ All you gotta do is the condom rag,” 
finally concluding after a brief scat improvisation section: “remember boys, don’t be no dunce/ 
Only use that condom once/ See it’s easy and fun, and it ain’t a drag/ Groovin’ and doin’ the 
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condom rag!” 80 Most observers found it a lighthearted and catchy way to promote condom 
usage.81 
 One listener, however, was distinctly unamused: Governor Thompson. After hearing the 
song in Springfield, he convened a press conference to excoriate it. Calling it “outrageous” and 
“garbage, plain garbage,” Thompson declared, “If I were innocently walking the streets with my 
family and I had to hear that, standing where I was on the sidewalks where I had a right to be, I 
would be offended, and I think the people of Illinois would be offended… Everyone will think we 
are lunatics.” He swore that the song would never be performed publicly again.82 Unfortunately, 
the IDPH could not react in time, and the song was performed at a festival in Chicago a few 
hours later, further incensing the governor. The IDPH offered confused apologies. At first 
repentant, spokesman Thomas Schafer explained that “we didn’t want to make light of AIDS, 
which is a very serious disease, but we thought this was one way to get people’s attention. 
Certainly, if the governor doesn’t want it performed… it won’t be performed.” He added that the 
song had undergone multiple edits and that the performed version was much censored from the 
original, but acknowledged that editing may have been insufficient. 83  
In subsequent remarks, the IDPH was less contrite. Spokesman Dean Schott replied: 
“The use of condoms reduces the risk of AIDS. To deny that information to the public is to deny 
them information on a way to protect themselves,” and Turnock said only, “I don’t know how you 
can educate people about AIDS and condoms without talking about condoms.”84 The governor 
argued in response: “But is that what we should foist on the general public? What about children 
																																																								
80 Illinois Department of Public Health, “Condom Rag,” 1987.  
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passing by? Is that the kind of song you want to listen to with your child? People will think we 
have taken leave of our senses.”85   
 The governor was very concerned about the effect the song would have on Illinois’ 
reputation. Ironically, if he had not held a press conference to denounce the “Condom Rag,” the 
song probably would not have generated the attention that it did. Performed only for a small 
audience in Springfield and then in Chicago, it would have gone unnoticed. With the governor’s 
outrage and subsequent press conference, though, national and international press coverage 
flooded in. Articles on the “Condom Rag” and Thompson’s strong reaction featured in The New 
York Times and in newspapers as far away as Australia. Viewed only as an AIDS publicity 
campaign, the “Condom Rag” was an unrivaled success. The IDPH later estimated that 67 
million people listened to (and perhaps even learned from) the song. In the three months 
following its release, there was a 15% increase in condom use among young, single Illinoisans, 
particularly minority youth.86 It brought overwhelming media attention to the IDPH’s AIDS 
prevention efforts, which boosted participation at subsequent events. Without the “Condom 
Rag,” it is unlikely that most Illinoisans would have even known that the AIDS, Facts for Life 
campaign happened.   
However, the “Condom Rag” harmed other sides of the AIDS response, particularly 
political advocacy. By acting insensitively towards the conservative religious and political views 
of many Illinoisans, the IDPH sacrificed its limited political capital with Thompson and many of 
its alliances in the Illinois General Assembly. As media attention mounted, the legislature 
became involved and accused the IDPH of wasting money on a joke public relations campaign. 
They blamed Thompson for giving the IDPH too much leeway in the midst of a deadly epidemic. 
Fielding complaints and questions from constituents, and already skeptical of the efficacy of 																																																								
85 Blumenthal, “Rap-Style Jingle On Condoms Squelched By Governor.” 
86 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 6.  
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education, many legislators were fed up and disappointed with the IDPH. Senate Minority 
Leader Aldo DeAngelis criticized the IDPH, declaring, “The public is demanding a response, but, 
so far, that response has been ‘privacy at any cost’ and public relations campaigns.” In a move 
that was equal parts spite and politics, the legislature cut the proposed AIDS education budget 
for 1988 from $2.5 million to $100, declaring AIDS education a waste of money. 87 To the 
legislature, the IDPH staff were confused medical “experts,” trying hip, cockamamie schemes 
with education and sex chats, rather than doing their job: hard science and protecting the public. 
Legislators could not understand why Turnock ignored the public health powers at his disposal, 
like mandatory testing, contact tracing, and quarantine, and they accused him of not taking the 
epidemic seriously.88 Turnock offered his resignation.89  
The IDPH forgot that they and the General Assembly had different immediate 
constituencies. The IDPH needed the cooperation of the gay community and other HIV-risk 
communities, which required slower, voluntary approaches to fighting the epidemic, like 
education and anonymous testing. The General Assembly needed the support of a majority of 
the electorate, many of them uninformed and completely hysterical about AIDS.  By failing to 
respect the General Assembly’s needs, the IDPH lost the support of many legislators. Slow and 
voluntary did not win votes, and there appeared little benefit to risking one’s neck for politically 
obtuse and seemingly ineffective public health schemes.  
 
A New Plan of Action 
 After the “Condom Rag” scandal, the Illinois General Assembly took over.  Although 
Illinois legislators had proposed legislation on AIDS throughout 1986 and early 1987, none of 
the bills had passed, perhaps out of respect for the IDPH and its ability to handle the epidemic. 																																																								
87 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 6; the funding was restored in early 1988.  
88 85th Illinois General Assembly House of Rep. Transcription Debate, May 19, 1987. 
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Now, harassed by terrified constituents, frightened by ongoing media coverage of AIDS, and 
thoroughly unimpressed by the IDPH’s efforts at prevention, legislators decided that they 
needed more aggressive action. Education and voluntary HIV testing were insufficient against 
an enemy such as AIDS. The Illinois General Assembly would legislate its way to a cure.   
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“Heterosexual sex within marriage is what most Americans, our laws  
and our traditions consider the proper focus of human sexuality.” 
 
- Internal memo written by U.S. Undersecretary  
of Education Gary Bauer, 19871 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Passing the Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing Law, April-June 1987 
 
 Penny Pullen provoked strong reactions. Phyllis Schlafly loved her. Critics declared her 
“irrational,” ”inconsistent,” and “hypocritical.”2 An Illinois representative conceded:  
I disagree with almost everything she says, but I like her. She’s sincere without being 
sentimental, she understands power, and although she would never compromise her 
principles, she has a very pragmatic side that makes her effective in politics. People who 
label her a demagogue and write her off are making a mistake.3 
 
There were people who wanted to kill her, and there were the people who elected her. Another 
of her colleagues noted that Pullen was one of the only female Illinois legislators who refused to 
join the Illinois bipartisan Conference of Women Legislators, observing that “it’s her attitude on 
things like that that puts people off.”4 Described in turns as intelligent, stupid, Victorian, sensible, 
crazy, and a spinster, friends and foes alike agreed on one thing: Miss Penny Pullen, 
Republican representative from Park Ridge, was a formidable woman.5  
As for Pullen herself, she cared little about others’ opinions. Made House Minority 
Leader in January 1987, she held herself accountable only to God—“her co-pilot”—and was 
proud of and passionate about her fights against abortion, government intrusion, taxes, and, 
now, the AIDS epidemic.6 A dedicated member of Schlafly’s Eagle Forum and a devout 
Protestant, she believed “body, mind, heart and soul” that she was right. Asked whom she 																																																								
1 Qtd. in Brier, Infectious Ideas, 87. 
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admired, Pullen said, “I don’t have many human heroes. When anyone is compared to Jesus 
Christ, they fall short.”7  
Pullen had been interested in the AIDS epidemic for a while. Moved by the stories of 
infants born with the disease and of women unknowingly infected by their faithless husbands, 
AIDS fueled her already strong beliefs that sex was acceptable only in the context of 
monogamous, heterosexual relationships, bound by marriage.8 She believed that religion had an 
important role to play in the fight against AIDS, noting that “the church is the institution that 
civilizes society.”9 From the start, she had doubted the competence of the Illinois Department of 
Public Health (IDPH) and was one of a few legislators to unsuccessfully propose AIDS 
legislation in 1986.10 Now, in 1987, she felt vindicated in her skepticism, and more determined 
than ever to protect the innocent victims of the AIDS epidemic. She had many ideas, among 
them, mandatory premarital HIV testing (MPHT).  
Although Pullen was the most powerful voice behind MPHT, she was not alone. Many 
Illinoisans held similar Christian beliefs, and still more commiserated with her distrust of the 
IDPH’s plan to combat the epidemic.11 MPHT became the solution, despite substantial problems 
with the program. Supporters of MPHT overlooked these concerns, because they had a 
fundamentally different understanding of the AIDS epidemic than opponents. Medical distrust 
lay at the core of their dispute, as supporters and opponents disagreed about the validity of 
medical research and public health ethics. In most cases, these debates resisted resolution 
because they proceeded from such different assumptions, making it possible for supporters to 
justify MPHT, even as opponents declared the opposite. MPHT provoked debate about 
medicine, ethics, religion, blame, and the relationship between political representatives, experts, 																																																								
7 Ibid.   
8 “Abstinence group to honor former Rep. Penny Pullen October 20th,” Illinois Review, Sept. 22, 2016.    
9 Qtd. in Petro, After the Wrath of God, 44.  
10 Turnock, interview with author.   
11 Daley, “TV Barriers to Condom Ads Breaking Down.” 
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and constituents. In the summer of 1987, medical distrust, AIDS hysteria, and unique Illinois 
political circumstance combined, and the MPHT law passed. 
 
Turnock Survives—Barely  
 Governor Thompson refused Turnock’s resignation. He did not think the scandal 
sufficient to cost Turnock his position.12 However, there were more players involved than 
Thompson. Turnock was up for reconfirmation. As a Republican nominee, Turnock already 
faced opposition from Senate Democrats. Turnock’s refusal to conduct AIDS contact-tracing and 
MPHT alienated Senate Republicans.13 Pullen, in particular, detested Turnock, and called for his 
removal. Many observers believed his time as IDPH director was limited.14 In an internal memo 
to the governor, Turnock wrote:  
Legislative approaches that appear to deal decisively with AIDS by mandating testing or 
mandating contact tracing will actually serve to weaken our control efforts. Focusing 
primarily on these approaches without appropriate attention to other “softer” strategies, 
such as broadly based general education, focused education, voluntary testing, and 
contact referral assistance will only serve to disarm us in this battle against AIDS…I 
don’t think this is a disease we can legislate out of existence. 15  
 
In reconfirmation hearings, he asserted that education and voluntary testing were the only 
strategies he would support.16 In response, Republican Senate President James Phillip told 
Turnock that he would not be confirmed until he agreed to oversee contact tracing and MPHT.17 
Thompson tried to intervene on Turnock’s behalf, but he was already waging a war with the 
General Assembly to get his tax increase and budget approved. He could do nothing. The 
Senate would not back down, and neither would Turnock. Reconfirmation came to a standstill.18  
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Problems with Police Powers 
 The public health police powers that the Senate wanted Turnock to use already 
generated controversy. Under existing public health law, Turnock wielded enormous power: he 
could force people to submit to blood tests and vaccines; he could make them confess their 
sexual partners and personal habits; he could ban any behavior that posed a public health risk; 
he could close businesses he deemed dangerous; he could confine people to their homes 
indefinitely with little justification; he could have individuals committed to institutions for the rest 
of their lives. Implementing these powers required virtually no cooperation from the General 
Assembly or the governor, and minimal work within the court system.19  
 These powers were out of step with other legal trends. Since the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) to permit contraception use among married couples, most 
American judicial rulings had increased protection of individual privacy, rather than circumscribe 
it.20 Between 1965 and 1980, the Supreme Court ruled on more than fifty cases about marriage, 
divorce, the family, and reproductive rights, and with few exceptions, promoted privacy and 
individual choice.21 Public health police powers had not followed that pattern. After outbreaks of 
smallpox, tuberculosis, and syphilis in the early 1900s, public health police powers were rarely 
used. Instead, public health practitioners opted for cooperation over coercion, and in the 
absence of any serious epidemic, their police powers faded from judicial scrutiny.22  
However, the laws permitting them remained on the books. Many states still allowed 
major intrusions on individual privacy and choice in the name of public health, often only with the 
prerequisite that public health authorities demonstrate “some reasonable relationship” between 
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their intervention and public health good.23 To 1980s legal scholars’ dismay, this “reasonable” 
relationship had been interpreted loosely, and judges’ interpretation of legal precedent usually 
deferred to public health officials’ wishes.24 As Scott Burris and Lawrence Gostin, two public 
health lawyers from the 1980s, explained:  
Faced with proposals to “quarantine” people with HIV, lawyers had to go back to 1905 to 
find the “leading” Supreme Court case on coercive public health measures, a case that 
dealt with compulsory smallpox vaccination in the face of an actual epidemic. Early 
commentators in HIV found themselves relying far more heavily on nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century cases about smallpox, cholera, tuberculosis, and yellow fever 
than any contemporary decisions.25 
 
As the AIDS epidemic took off, lawyers and courts scrambled to address the gross constitutional 
rights violations that public health police powers could pose to people with HIV.  
 Public health practitioners found themselves in a similar quandary. They recognized the 
enormous power they possessed but had little intent to use it. Even in the 1800s and 1900s, 
public health boards avoided police powers, because of the community outrage they provoked.26 
Public health philosophy since the 1950s had increasingly emphasized soft power and trust-
building, rather than forcible measures. Officials reserved public health police powers for the 
direst circumstances—when smallpox surfaced or for outbreaks of meningitis on college 
campuses.27  
HIV differed from most communicable diseases. It was neither as contagious nor as fast-
acting as most communicable illnesses.28 Infected individuals could live for years with no visible 
symptoms, complicating patient identification. The lack of a cure meant that infected individuals 
remained infected for the rest of their lives, making isolation a life sentence, rather than a matter 
																																																								
23 Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences, 9.  
24 Burris and Gostin, “The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the Development of Public Health Law,” 99. 
25 Ibid, 96.  
26 Colgrove and Bayer, “Manifold Restraints,” 572.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Kathleen Sullivan and Martha Field, “AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State,” Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 23 (1988): 147-8.  
	 44 
of weeks. HIV was inextricably linked with anal sex and injection drug use, behaviors that were 
still shrouded in shame. Identification of HIV-positive individuals could expose them to 
discrimination against gay men and drug users, on top of the discrimination against people with 
HIV. Public health officials worried that using their police powers would increase the stigma that 
already surrounded HIV, because it would seem to validate unspoken claims that having HIV 
was a crime deserving of punishment. Health officials believed that this stigma could prove a 
major obstacle to treatment and prevention, as people with HIV might choose to hide their 
infection rather than seek help.29 Public health experts quickly realized that their police powers 
were useless, if not counterproductive, to the fight against HIV. Nearly all public health 
authorities, the CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and almost every American 
professional medical association spoke out against their use, especially when applied to 
MPHT.30  
 
The Illinois AIDS Package 
 The Illinois General Assembly did not trust the advice of public health professionals. 
Starting in May, Pullen led Republicans and some Democrats in the House and Senate in an 
aggressive AIDS approach. All told, they proposed sixty bills to combat AIDS.31 One bill 
mandated contact tracing, in which the IDPH forced infected individuals to report all sexual and 
drug use partners, whom the IDPH contacted and tested for HIV, and, if found positive, repeated 
the procedure.32 They proposed mandatory HIV testing for all hospital admissions, mandatory 
notification for the employers of HIV-positive health care workers, mandatory testing for 
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prisoners and accused sex offenders, mandatory testing of sex workers, and mandatory school 
notification of infected students.33 Legislators required blood banks to permit personal blood 
supplies.34 They introduced several variants of MPHT.35   
Throughout the debates on the bills, legislators treated the facts of the AIDS epidemic 
lightly. Pullen and her allies ignored opponents’ complaints about the high price tags on some of 
the programs, arguing that any cost was acceptable if it saved lives.36 Bills were vague, with 
little detail about the particulars of medical procedures, probably because the bills were written 
without medical advice. As one opponent of the mandatory hospital testing bill, Rep. Jim McPike 
(D-Alton), observed: 
So, I have my children’s 75 year old grandmother going in for an exam which may 
require a very minimum amount of invasion and not as a surgical procedure, but a very 
minimum amount of invasion, and I don’t know what it is because neither does the 
Sponsor of the Bill, and she’s going to be tested for AIDS. I just think that you’ve gone a 
little bit too far here and that you’re testing every single person that goes into the hospital 
for really no rhyme or reason.37 
 
Nonetheless, most Illinois legislators supported the AIDS bills, MPHT in particular.38  
 
Public Health Concerns 
 Opponents to MPHT had a variety of concerns. These concerns fall into three groupings: 
problems with the medical tests used to diagnose HIV, worries about the burden of mandatory 
testing on patients, and skepticism about making the married population the focus of mandatory 
testing. Together, these concerns formed a powerful counterargument to calls for MPHT.  
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Doubt about the accuracy and efficacy of HIV diagnostic tests formed the bedrock of the 
opposition to MPHT. In order to diagnose HIV, the CDC recommended that physicians first 
perform an ELISA antibody test, followed by a repeated ELISA and the more complicated 
Western Blot test if results were positive. If all three tests returned positive, then the physician 
diagnosed HIV.39  Even with these stringent regulations, though, the HIV tests still returned the 
wrong result about 1% of the time. In particular, the test was vulnerable to producing false 
positives, especially in low-risk populations.40 Statisticians estimated that when applied to the 
married population—which was at very low risk of HIV—as many as 90% of initially positive test 
results would prove to be negative in reality.41 Researchers were also concerned about the 
latency period of HIV. Both the ELISA and Western Blot tests identified the presence of 
antibodies to HIV. In most cases, it takes a long time for the body to develop these antibodies—
at least six weeks—and there were reports of latency periods that lasted six months to a year.42 
During that time, a person with HIV would still test negative, and public health officials worried 
that a false negative test result might promote risky behavior and feelings of invincibility.43 
Although latency periods were a concern with all HIV tests, they were a particular problem for 
MPHT, because couples could not always wait the recommended three to six months after 
exposure due to fixed wedding dates.  
Researchers remained unsure of what a positive HIV test even meant. Scientists agreed 
that AIDS only occurred in HIV-positive people, but they did not know if all HIV-positive people 
would develop AIDS. At the time of the Illinois MPHT bill, opponents of the bill argued that the 
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HIV antibody test “has no diagnostic, prognostic, or predictive value. It cannot forecast whether 
individuals will or will not contract AIDS.”44 The HIV test could identify individuals exposed to 
HIV, whether through drug use, sexual transmission, or blood transfusion, but not which 
individuals would become sick. As a result, some scientists suspected that proposals for 
mandatory HIV testing served more as an identification of socially unacceptable behavior than 
as a medical prognostic measure.45 Given the concerns about test accuracy, many researchers 
believed that mandating HIV testing in the low risk married population was medically 
irresponsible.46  
Test accuracy aside, opponents to MPHT expressed serious alarm about the burden of 
HIV testing on patients. A positive HIV test result exacted major emotional and mental 
consequences. Research suggested that 14% of HIV-positive people contemplated suicide in 
the wake of their diagnosis.47 In Illinois, there were several suicides related to positive HIV 
tests.48 When it approved the ELISA test, the FDA placed an explicit prohibition on giving it to 
anyone at “risk of suicide, homicide, or other sociopathic behavior; risk of abandoning drug 
treatment; or other probable adverse outcomes.”49 Mandatory testing ignored those 
contraindications, and often failed to provide the mental health counseling necessary for HIV-
positive people.  
Opponents of mandatory HIV testing worried about discrimination against HIV-positive 
people, given the fear surrounding the disease. There were ample examples: In Florida, fearful 
neighbors burned down the house of a family with three HIV-positive hemophiliac toddlers.50 A 
doctor shared a patient’s positive HIV-status with the patient’s employer of ten years, and when 																																																								
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the patient arrived at work the next morning, he found the building locked, with a note stuck to 
the door:  
Tommy—You’re not supposed to come into the office. The checks are not in. We will 
mail it to you. Also, your sick benefits will start back now that you’ve taken the test… Be 
sure that you do not come back to the office.—Shirley.51  
 
HIV-positive people lost their health insurance, their visitation rights with their children, and the 
right to send their children to school.52 Polls showed that nearly half of Americans approved of 
identity cards for HIV-positive people, and more than 15% favored tattooing them.53 An editorial 
in the New York Times advocated for sterilization of HIV-positive people.54 The social 
consequences of having one’s HIV status revealed could be devastating, and taking an HIV test 
made those risks real.   
Moreover, as some of these stories suggest, confidentiality was far from assured. In the 
1980s, medical privacy protection remained weak. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), with its sweeping protection of patient privacy, would not be passed 
until 1996.55 In many cases, physicians and government employees committed the most 
egregious violations of patient confidentiality when it came to HIV.56 Even when those in power 
protected confidentiality, public health records of HIV-positive people’s names were occasionally 
stolen, as happened in Los Angeles and New York City.57 HIV-positive people worried about 
blackmail, whether to reveal their HIV status or to suggest that they were gay or an injection 
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drug user.58 Some feared that the police could obtain the lists and use them to prosecute drug 
use and sodomy, both of which remained crimes in many U.S. states.59 
In the case of MPHT, opponents were also unsure whether the state should require an 
individual to tell their spouse their HIV status. There was no doubt that individuals who received 
an HIV test needed to know their own status, and that HIV-positive individuals ought to inform 
their partners.60 However, there were concerns about harm to the HIV-positive partner after 
revealing their HIV status. In Mesquite, Texas, Dr. Robert Huse’s ex-lover shared Huse’s HIV 
status with community members after a difficult breakup. Huse received death threats and had 
to give up his pediatrics practice after losing most of his terrified patients.61 Research found that 
HIV-positive people (particularly women) who shared their status with their partners were at 
increased risk of abandonment, domestic violence, and murder at the hands of their partners.62 
In the face of these serious repercussions, public health officials acknowledged that partners 
needed to be informed, but decried MPHT’s lack of discretion, follow-up, and counseling. 
Above all, opponents worried about the effect that MPHT would have on HIV stigma.63 
People with HIV already confronted discrimination in their daily lives, but at least that 
discrimination did not have state sanction. With MPHT, though, discrimination against people 
with HIV would be codified into public health practice. Public health practice would validate the 
belief that people with HIV were unsuitable spouses and parents, and the consequences of 
revealing positive HIV status would rise. MPHT implied that no one with HIV would willingly 
disclose their status to their partner (and that no one would stay with an HIV-positive partner), 
which offered little incentive for honesty and open communication about HIV. MPHT endorsed 																																																								
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59 Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences, 91.  
60 Gostin, The AIDS Pandemic, 46. 
61 Kinsella, Covering the Plague, 203-4.  
62 Gostin, The AIDS Pandemic, 173; Closen et al., “AIDS: Testing Democracy,” 876.  
63 Mann, “Health and Human Rights,” 116; “Surgeon General’s Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome,” 30-4. 
	 50 
the worst assumptions about HIV-positive people’s human nature, and public health officials 
feared that MPHT might make those assumptions into reality. With the added stigma, people 
with HIV might choose to hide their status, suffering their illness in silence and complicating 
public health’s already challenging task of tracking the epidemic and containing its spread.   
The uncertain benefit of MPHT only added to opponents’ fury and frustration at the 
legislation. Public health ethics assert that any intervention must offer greater benefit than 
burden, ideally with the benefit going to the population burdened.64 In light of the substantial 
burden of MPHT—uncertain test results, severe mental/emotional health consequences, social 
discrimination, confidentiality violations, potential destruction of close personal relationships, 
and the increase in HIV stigma—the legislation needed to offer equivalently weighty benefit to 
someone. Supporters argued that MPHT would prevent the birth of HIV-positive babies, protect 
spouses from exposing each other to HIV, provide better information about the epidemic, and 
increase public awareness of HIV. Opponents saw little empirical support for these rewards. 
 Opponents of MPHT doubted that MPHT’s focus on marriage would actually protect 
spouses and babies from HIV exposure. Throughout the 1970s, couples had taken a more 
flexible approach towards marriage. Divorce and remarriage rates rose, and cohabitation 
increased in popularity.65 At the time of MPHT, 91% of American women under age 30 reported 
having had premarital sex, and only 63% of American births were conceived within marriage.66 
Opponents of MPHT argued that most American couples had already exposed each other to 
HIV, making MPHT useless.67 Even after marriage, couples were sometimes unfaithful, and 
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could expose themselves (and their spouse) in that way.68 As for arguments that MPHT would 
prevent the birth of HIV-positive infants, opponents observed that prenatal testing would be 
more to the point—not all married couples had children, and moreover, most children born with 
HIV were born to unmarried women.69 These concerns about MPHT resembled those lobbed at 
abstinence-only education for HIV prevention. As Tim Drake, leader of the Chicago Area 
Republican Gay Organization, remarked: “[Pullen’s] pushing abstinence as a solution. Well, 
sorry. We don’t have time in dealing with this crisis to wait for a Victorian society to come back 
into vogue.”70 Opponents criticized supporters’ focus on marriage as antiquated and misguided. 
Even if opponents of MPHT accepted the premise that it would protect spouses and help 
prevent the birth of HIV-infected babies, they still had serious qualms about the legislation. 
Traditionally, mandatory screening programs aimed to identify infected persons for early 
treatment or prevention. By these criteria, MPHT overwhelmingly failed. In March 1987, the FDA 
had just approved the first therapy for HIV, ziduvodine (AZT)—and the Illinois General Assembly 
added it to Medicaid coverage in May—but the efficacy of the treatment was still unclear, and 
doctors were uncertain about which patients would benefit from the medicine. Doctors had yet to 
determine dosing, treatment timing, and side effect management.71 Moreover, MPHT would 
miss the vast majority of patients who might benefit from AZT, because 90% of Americans with 
HIV were either gay men or injection drug users, neither of whom married frequently.72 
Research suggested that MPHT would catch less than 0.1% of Americans infected with HIV, 
making it fairly pointless for early treatment, prevention, and understanding the spread of the 
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epidemic.73 Even if supporters hoped that knowledge of one’s HIV status might result in safer 
behavior, research had failed to demonstrate a relationship between knowledge of HIV status 
and lasting behavioral change.74 MPHT offered negligible demonstrable benefits to patients and 
researchers, at great cost to the married population.  
Because of these problems, MPHT appeared a gross waste of funds to opponents. 
Public health practitioners wrote: 
Any expenditure of funds on inefficient or wasteful programs diverts money from budgets 
for educational programs, medical research, and medical services. Mandatory premarital 
HIV testing is inefficient and flagrantly wasteful…The money that would be spent on 
testing marriage license applicants has a much more valuable use elsewhere in the HIV-
AIDS battle.75 
   
They demanded more funding for education and preventative services for high-risk 
populations.76 MPHT seemed an insidious distraction that allowed legislators to appear 
proactive while actually avoiding “the more difficult task of developing a comprehensive policy to 
deal with the problem,” as one critic pointed out.77 This stance revealed a fundamental 
misunderstanding between opponents and supporters of MPHT. Opponents failed to grasp the 
extent to which (some) supporters truly believed in the program—and deeply distrusted medical 
advice—and their reasons for doing so. 
 
Supporter Rationale 
 To understand support for MPHT, it is necessary to explain what supporters saw as the 
strengths of the bill, but also how they responded to opponents’ criticisms. Supporters believed 																																																								
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that MPHT would prevent the infection of spouses, reduce the birth of HIV-positive babies, 
provide epidemiological knowledge of the disease’s spread, increase public awareness of the 
epidemic, and promote healthier behavior among those who tested HIV-positive. The legislation 
cost the state little money, because couples paid for the testing. Opponents mounted 
aggressive, scientifically convincing arguments against all of these claims.  
How did supporters respond to opponents’ systematic arguments? They didn’t. 
Supporters and opponents of MPHT grounded their case in completely different assumptions, 
rendering most of the debates futile. Supporters did not refute criticisms, because they did not 
recognize the critiques as legitimate. Opponents of MPHT based their arguments in medical 
research and the framework of public health ethics. To opponents, research was good evidence. 
They measured success by illnesses prevented and dollars maximized. In general, all American 
lives were equally worthy of saving, and an effective program used limited resources to save the 
maximum number of lives.  
Supporters, on the other hand, were distrustful of medical research and of the public 
health ethical framework. Many of them were devout traditional Christians, already suspicious of 
secular science and reason.78 The confused medical response to the AIDS epidemic had only 
increased their skepticism. They doubted the validity of medical research—especially if they 
disagreed with its conclusions—and they questioned many health care workers’ morality and 
honesty.79 Illinois state senator Aldo DeAngelis (R-Olympia Fields) reported that his constituents 
believed that medical experts “are hiding something, that they’re not telling the truth. There isn’t 
one person I talk to who doesn’t think AIDS spreads in more ways than we talk about.”80 
Supporters felt ignored, and worse still, patronized and mocked by researchers’ responses to 
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their concerns. Physicians’ obsession with numbers seemed coarse and unfeeling towards the 
fear of AIDS. As one letter-writer to the Journal of the American Medical Association suggested: 
Perhaps Dr Turnock and Mr Kelly should write a sequel entitled “I Married an HIV-
Positive Mate.” Perhaps they would find the human cost of this anguish easier to 
calculate than the poignant, but transitory, anguish of a false-positive result of an ELISA 
or even the more long-lasting anguish of a false-positive test result confirmed by 
Western blot testing.81 
 
Because of antipathy towards the medical community, most medical arguments against MPHT 
fell flat. The distrust of medicine allowed supporters of MPHT to disregard public health 
concerns about the accuracy of HIV diagnostic tests (curiously, supporters of MPHT trusted that 
medical creation), the uselessness of data from the married population, and the research 
suggesting that MPHT would do little to increase public awareness of HIV and encourage safer 
behavior. Supporters of MPHT saw little reason to respond to medical concerns about the 
legislation. Medicine invalidated itself.  
 Supporters of MPHT took issue with public health ethics, which fundamentally differed 
from their moral beliefs, derived from the doctrines of traditional Christianity. Public health 
ethics’ assertion that all lives were equally worthy of saving rested at the core of their dispute. 
Public health officials tried to prioritize the allocation of resources to populations with the 
greatest need, regardless of how they got their illness.82 Public health practitioners asserted that 
behavior was the product of the environment, and that social, economic, and cultural injustices 
lurked beneath many HIV-positive diagnoses. 83 Regardless of their opinions on homosexuality 
and injection drug use, public health officials tried to keep their personal beliefs from interfering 
with their professional conduct.  
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To supporters of MPHT, this was a galling premise. They asserted that gay men and 
injection drug users had engaged in immoral behavior and that they bore responsibility for their 
illness.84 This perspective was summarized well by Ronald Goodwin, the vice-president of the 
Moral Majority, when he declared: 
We feel the deepest sympathy for AIDS victims, but I’m upset that the government is not 
spending more money to protect the general public from the gay plague. What I see is a 
commitment to spend our tax dollars on research to allow these diseased homosexuals 
to go back to their perverted practices without any standards of accountability.85  
 
Jerry Falwell and the National Association of Evangelicals expressed similar sentiments, calling 
for harsher actions against gay men with HIV and more support for the “general” population.86 
Helpless infants, naïve brides, and the unknowing recipients of infected blood transfusions 
deserved limitless pity, compassion, and support; other victims of the AIDS epidemic had 
brought it upon themselves. As scholar Anthony Petro argues, the traditional Christian moral 
framework created a “hierarchy of victimhood” in which “innocent” victims of the epidemic were 
more worthy of treatment and aid than guilty ones.87 The media only fed the frenzy by 
disproportionately covering “innocent” cases, suggesting that these cases were more common 
than reality.88 Unfortunately, public health language about the epidemic also contributed. As 
Petro explains, public health language   
[cited] ‘sexual promiscuity,’ as opposed to a viral agent, as the cause of AIDS: the 
implication being that heterosexual monogamy was the clear remedy. The conflation of 
sexual promiscuity, homosexuality, and AIDS led many Americans to infer that the 
purportedly immoral lifestyle of homosexuals was a central reason for the outbreak and 
spread of the disease.89 
 
The hierarchy of victimhood explained many of the arguments in favor of MPHT. 
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The hierarchy of victimhood made it possible for supporters of MPHT to justify spending 
enormous quantities of money on a policy that did little to help the majority of AIDS victims. 
Dozens of gay men died of AIDS each day, and public health officials recommended investing 
limited resources in research, education, and medical care focused on them and other high-risk 
groups. Instead, policymakers became obsessed with spending those dollars on efforts to save 
the lives of “innocent” victims—children born with AIDS, or women unknowingly infected by their 
partners—regardless the cost.90 Supporters of MPHT prioritized the lives of HIV-infected infants 
and spouses over those of gay men and injection drug users.  
The hierarchy of victimhood contributed to supporters’ focus on marriage, which also 
harkened back to traditional Christian beliefs. Supporters of MPHT took marriage as a synonym 
for sexual initiation despite the fact that for many couples, they were not the same.91 For some 
supporters, this might have been an honest misunderstanding about the reality of American 
relationships; for others, MPHT was a way to endorse abstinence until marriage and to implicitly 
condemn couples who refused to comply. MPHT protected only certain types of couples: those 
who waited to have sexual relations until marriage. In this fashion, MPHT legislated premarital 
sex into the hierarchy of victimhood. A virgin bride infected by her new husband was truly 
blameless, but a woman who had sexual relations before MPHT could protect her was complicit 
in her own infection. Furthermore, by endorsing MPHT, supporters increased the importance of 
marriage and protected the institution from the scourge of HIV. Pullen herself asserted that 
MPHT was not about preventing AIDS, it was about ensuring the safety of relationships “with 
state sanction.”92 As one supporter of the Illinois bill wrote: 
Dr Turnock and Mr Kelly conveniently ignore marriage as an institution sanctioned by the 
state for monogamous sexuality, identification of parenthood, and the rearing of children. 
It is a difficult, but not impossible, impulse for people in courtship to require one another 																																																								
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to be tested for human immunodeficiency virus, and such an impulse deserves the 
support of the state.93 
 
With MPHT, supporters upheld the institution’s perceived purity, by (supposedly) ensuring that 
no married couple could have HIV. Marriage represented safety, and those who got married 
could be assumed to be HIV-negative.  
 The hierarchy of victimhood also explained supporters’ flippancy about the burden of HIV 
testing. Sometimes, supporters of MPHT were the same individuals who advocated for 
repressive measures against HIV-positive people.94 Although never explicitly stated, some 
supporters might have felt that the discrimination to which MPHT exposed some patients was 
fair punishment for guilty victims of HIV. In most cases, MPHT would identify individuals infected 
by drug abuse or sexual relations, both of whom fell low on the hierarchy. Ideally, that diagnosis 
would remain unknown to everyone but the patient’s spouse, but if not, it was a risk to which 
one consented when engaging in unacceptable behaviors.95 In a letter-to-the-editor published in 
The Chicago Tribune, Pullen alluded to these beliefs while arguing against the IDPH’s concerns 
about confidentiality. She accused the IDPH of being “handwringers who put political sensitivity 
ahead of their duty to protect the public health” and who contributed to “ignorance, driving the 
epidemic underground; if one is not diagnosed, goes the reasoning, one’s diagnosis cannot be 
‘leaked.’”96 
 Supporters of MPHT saw a very different picture of medicine than opponents. When 
opponents based their arguments in research and public health ethics, supporters remained 
skeptical. Their fear of the AIDS epidemic, disappointment with the medical response, and 
Christian worldview combined to make them intensely distrustful of medical research. Public 																																																								
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health ethics conflicted with their interpretation of Christianity’s teachings on morality. As a 
result, supporters were able to write off many of the criticisms of MPHT as simply untrue, by 
their perception of truth.  
 
The Anticlimactic Passage of MPHT   
 When debating MPHT, policymakers and public health officials had different priorities. 
Both groups wanted to be ethical and to produce effective policy. For public health officials, 
MPHT accomplished neither. For politicians, the debate about MPHT was more nuanced. 
Legislators in the supporters’ camp disagreed with public health officials about criteria for ethics 
and good policy, and they fully supported MPHT. For most legislators, however, it came down to 
one final priority: voter appeal. Most voters supported MPHT—as many as 80% of Americans, 
by some polls.97 The public had little trust for medical experts, and MPHT seemed like a simple 
and effective measure against the epidemic. As Senator DeAngelis (R-Olympia Fields) 
explained, “When I used to respond that we were trying to educate people, most people laughed 
and said that was woefully inadequate. It’s not a conservative-liberal issue. It’s a constituent 
issue.”98  
Nonetheless, Illinois was one of only two states to pass MPHT, for several reasons. 99 In 
most states, the public health department retained its authority, and professional medical 
organizations contributed to the outcry against proposals for MPHT. In Illinois, though, the IDPH 
had already lost most of its authority with the “Condom Rag” incident. Furthermore, the Illinois 
American Medical Association (AMA), the most powerful medical lobby in the state, chose to 																																																								
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stay out of the fray. By coincidence, the Illinois General Assembly was rewriting the medical 
licensing law in spring 1987, which would have major ramifications on the rules of medical 
practice. The Illinois AMA, worried about retaliation if they got involved in the AIDS debate, 
decided to remain silent on the Illinois AIDS program.100 These two circumstances, unique to 
Illinois, meant that legislators and the public were either unconvinced by or unaware of many of 
the most persuasive public health arguments against MPHT.  
 MPHT passed smoothly. It had few outspoken opponents in either chamber, perhaps 
because legislators saved their energy for other, more dangerous AIDS proposals. Throughout 
the debate, Illinois public health and medical experts weathered attacks on their competence at 
and dedication to fighting AIDS. The General Assembly-appointed expert panel on AIDS voted 
unanimously against the bill, but legislators paid them no heed.101 Pullen and her allies quickly 
cut down any other opposition. Fear permeated the debate. For example, when legislators 
questioned the need for testing, a representative declared that the death toll from AIDS in San 
Francisco was greater than that of World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War 
combined, a statistic no more true today than in 1987.102 On another occasion, Rep. Ron 
Stephens (R-St. Clair) declared: 
If it’s necessary that we spend those funds to save lives and human tragedy, then I 
suggest that we ought to get about that. If we find that it’s… that it’s more cost effective 
to let AIDS spread and let our society die, to let the AIDS virus spread to the point where 
it is in Zaire today, where 40 percent, 40 percent of the entire population of the Country 
of Zaire in central Africa, Ladies and Gentleman, has the AIDS virus. Those people have 
received their death certificates, and I suggest that in Illinois, we not allow this virus to 
spread unchecked.103 
 
On the second reading of the MPHT bill on May 19, two representatives attempted an 
amendment that permitted the IDPH to “exempt certain classes of individuals from the 																																																								
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requirements of House Bill 2044 as amended when there is good reason to do so,” offering up 
adults over age 65 as an example. Pullen rose immediately to declare: “It’s quite clear that this 
Amendment is intended to gut the testing provisions that this House has adopted in this Bill and 
to restore to the IDPH all the decision making concerning this epidemic…I urge defeat of this 
Amendment.” Two other representatives followed her lead, one questioning the IDPH’s 
willingness to protect people and support the law, while the other sputtered that the IDPH  
might just say, well, that’s not a high risk group. Let’s throw them out. And as to people 
over 65, I… that one astounds me. I’m overwhelmed to think that the Representative 
from Chicago would think that people over age 65 do not have… enjoy sexual relations. 
That’s ridiculous.  
 
The amendment failed 87-26. 104  
The next day, on May 20, the debate shifted sharply in favor of MPHT. Turnock, his 
reconfirmation as IDPH director still stalled in the Senate, dropped his opposition to MPHT.105 
After meeting in private with Governor Thompson, Turnock agreed to change his stance, 
deciding that it was better that he stay in power and do what he could.106 He told the Senate that 
he would be willing to compromise on MPHT and contact tracing. He weathered serious 
opprobrium from the gay community, but he appeased the Senate. Turnock would continue as 
IDPH director, and supporters of MPHT now had the cooperation of the IDPH.107  
Two days later, at the third and final reading of the bill, Pullen declared it a “reasonable, 
moderate, prudent approach” and requested legislators’ support. Her leading opponent, Rep. 
Barbara Flynn Currie (D-Cook County), did the opposite, reminding legislators that: 
Virtually every item in House Bill 2044 was rejected unanimously by this [medical 
advisory] panel on the grounds that these measures will not help to prevent the spread 
of this disease, will not help educate and inform the public how they might protect 
themselves against the spread of this disease…Further, it will give people back home a 																																																								
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sense that they are protected, that we have done something that will help stop the 
spread of this disease. That sense of security, the false sense of security that is inherent 
in passage of House Bill 2044, is perhaps the best reason to stop it in its tracks.108 
 
Other opponents exhorted their colleagues to follow the example of Surgeon General Koop, “a 
man who is not going to allow himself to be stampeded against his better judgment into 
programs that are not going to have an effect,” and swore that “this Bill will come back to haunt 
us.” Their pleas fell on deaf ears. On May 22, 1987, the bill passed the House 91-19.109  
 In the Senate, it passed with virtually no discussion. A group of sixty medical 
professionals, ministers, lawyers, and public health officials visited the Senate to beseech them 
to vote against the bill, to no avail.110 One senator declared: 
We are flailing out trying to find some way to make ourselves and maybe our 
constituents think we have done something effective and we really are not thinking it 
through and…where that investment really ought to be put, and I think we’re just going 
off the deep end now.111 
 
Most senators were concerned with other provisions of the AIDS package, particularly the ones 
that cost more money.112 MPHT passed 38-16.113   
 
Conclusion 
 Looking back on 1987, Thompson noted: “It was not one of the better sessions of the 
General Assembly. If they had been as obsessed with education and the quality of life in this 
state as they were with AIDS, we’d have gone a lot further.”114 Pullen got her AIDS package, but 
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Thompson got neither his budget nor his tax increase.115 He had the rest of the summer to 
decide which bills he would sign.  
While the Illinois General Assembly debated the merits of MPHT, the U.S. Congress had 
also been hard at work on AIDS. On June 1, the Senate voted 96-0 to mandate HIV testing of all 
U.S. immigrants and residents, with the intent to deport those found positive.116 The CDC 
released its latest estimates of AIDS prevalence, finding that as many as 1.5 million Americans 
could be unknowingly infected, and that 500,000 Americans would die of AIDS by 1992.117 That 
summer, Reagan appointed his Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus Epidemic. Observers remarked that appointees seemed to have been chosen more for 
their conservative beliefs than for their AIDS-related credentials. No one with HIV was 
appointed, and only one gay person (geneticist Frank Lilly) made it on the commission. Two 
leading physicians were appointed, but both resigned because “the commission was too 
ideologically compromised to accomplish its goals.”118  
Pullen, however, was proud to report that she had been selected.119 Others were less 
pleased. Dr. Greg Shipman of the Howard Brown Memorial Clinic, a leading AIDS treatment 
center in Chicago, was unsurprised: “Those in the know believe the commission is another 
bunch of idiots appointed for political, doctrinaire reasons who will produce a report everybody 
will laugh at.”120 Tim Drake of the Chicago Area Republican Gay Organization called her 
appointment “absurd” and accused Pullen of being “more concerned with her own personal 
power and her own moral code than in promoting public health.”121 He concluded: “I think that 
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Rep. Pullen’s appointment is as inappropriate as appointing the grand dragon of the Ku Klux 
Klan to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.”122  
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“The problem, senators, is sex and drugs. There aren’t simplistic solutions.” 
 
- Renslow Sherer, chairman of the  
          Governor’s Council on AIDS, 19871 
 
Chapter Three 
The Fall of Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing, June 1987-September 1989 
 As 5:00 pm approached on Wednesday, Dec. 30, 1987, marriage license lines at Illinois 
county clerks’ offices stretched into the cold winter air. The new mandatory premarital HIV 
testing (MPHT) bill would go into effect Friday, and Thursday was a holiday. Although most 
couples swore that the bill had not affected their choice of date—they wanted “to ring in the New 
Year with wedding bells”—they certainly had opinions on the law. Darla Topping, one of nearly 
200 people waiting at the Cook County clerk’s office, complained about the test’s price, noting, 
“If the government is so concerned about our welfare, why don’t they pay for the test? If it’s 
going to be mandatory, it should be free.” Cheryl Anderson admitted that the test had sped up 
her wedding plans, explaining that she “would rather volunteer for the test than have someone 
tell me that I have to take it.” Denise Thomas said the thought of taking the test gave her chills; 
her fiancé, John Robinson, called the law “ridiculous” and declared that single people ought to 
be tested, not marriage applicants. Clerks scrambled to move couples through the line before 
closing time.2   
 The December 1987 rush for marriage licenses was a harbinger of trouble to come. Over 
the 21 months of the law’s implementation, Illinois saw its marriage rate plummet and its HIV 
clinics buckle under the overwhelming demand for HIV tests. The mandate identified only a few 
HIV-positive people, each at astronomical cost. Observers around the nation heaped scorn on 
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Illinois, and the state’s example deterred attempts at similar legislation in other states and at the 
federal level.  
Throughout the debate on MPHT, public health officials pointed out flaws with the bill, 
which legislators ignored or disbelieved. After implementation, legislators and the public 
observed unanticipated problems with MPHT: a drop in the marriage rate and economic 
consequences. Perhaps because of their focus on public health, public health officials had failed 
to emphasize these flaws, which became the primary cause of MPHT’s repeal. As a result, the 
failure of MPHT did not improve Illinois public health officials’ credibility. Legislators 
acknowledged their error in passing the legislation, but viewed it as an understandable accident 
and learning process, rather than an avoidable fiasco caused by their disavowal of public health 
advice. The Illinois experience with MPHT discredited it as a solution to the epidemic, but did 
little to restore public health credibility or to dissuade similarly repressive AIDS policy in Illinois 
and across the nation.  
 
 
To Veto or Not to Veto: Thompson Deliberates 
Prior to implementation, however, MPHT had to be signed, along with the other AIDS 
legislation that the General Assembly had passed. Governor James Thompson had his work cut 
out for him. The General Assembly had passed seventeen bills dealing with AIDS during their 
1987 session, described by the New York Times as the “toughest and most comprehensive” 
AIDS package in the country.3 Responses from public health professionals were unenthusiastic. 
Dr. Renslow Sherer, chair of the AIDS Interdisciplinary Advisory Council, explained: “There was 
an inability to distinguish what’s helpful from what just seemed tough, so they just went ahead 
																																																								
3 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 8.  
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and passed everything.”4 IDPH Director Bernard Turnock, although still officially supportive of 
MPHT and contact tracing, quipped that it was more “stampede” than legislation.5 A 
spokesperson for the IDPH observed that the measures were largely unnecessary, given that 
the department already had all of those powers and many more, and that the laws intruded on 
the department’s authority.6 Chicago newspapers disliked the AIDS package. The kindest 
editorial, in the Chicago Tribune, offered damning praise: “At least credit legislators in both the 
Illinois House and Senate with good intentions.”7 Others thought even that a stretch, and as the 
summer wore on, anonymous comments by legislators seemed to support them.8 One 
Democratic congressman admitted,  
I don’t like these bills, but I can’t do anything else. They’re repressive. They won’t work. 
But how can we go ask for votes in the American Legion Hall without saying we did 
something? It’s political survival.9  
 
Another remarked: “I don’t like the bills, but when I go home, I want to be re-elected.”10 
The fate of the AIDS package rested in Thompson’s hands. He knew that his decisions 
had national significance. Secretary of Education William Bennett had declared that Illinois was 
an example for the whole country and that Thompson’s choices would “set the agenda” for 
everyone.11 Thompson, the pragmatic son of a doctor, weighed the oppressiveness of the bills 
against his own re-election prospects. He was particularly concerned with funding for the AIDS 
bills, since the General Assembly had failed to pass his budget and tax increase. In budget 
planning, the Illinois AIDS advisory council had requested $12.4 million for the epidemic. 
																																																								
4 Qtd in Turnock, “IDPH History,” 9; the remark was made to the New York Times in 1988. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Griffin and Egler, “20 Legislative Bills Set Sights on AIDS.”  
7 Editorial, “Can New Laws Stop AIDS?,” Chicago Tribune, June 26, 1987.  
8 John Kass, “AIDS Package Caters to Voters Back Home,” Chicago Tribune, July 1, 1987.  
9 John Kass and Steve Daley, “The AIDS Dilemma: Lawmakers and Lobbyists Try to Please Everyone 
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10 Kass, “AIDS Package Caters to Voters Back Home.” 
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Thompson reduced that request to $4.6 million. The General Assembly provided $3.4 million.12 
The AIDS advisory council’s budget proposal had not included the cost of the measures passed 
by the General Assembly, and none of the AIDS bills contained funding mechanisms.13 Staffers 
estimated that the AIDS bills would cost the IDPH $3 million if signed, leaving a scant $400,000 
for all other AIDS prevention, education, and treatment activities—nowhere near enough.14 
Thompson criticized the General Assembly’s mixed messages, observing that “while the 
legislators passed what they heralded as the toughest anti-AIDS package in the nation, they 
didn’t give me a dime to do anything with it.”15  
Rep. Penny Pullen did her best to further discredit the IDPH and to remind Thompson of 
the consequences if he failed to pass her AIDS package. Later that summer, she called a press 
conference to award the “Tinker Bell Award” to Turnock, whom she still abhorred. As 
conservative legislators applauded, she congratulated Turnock on his achievement, declaring 
that, “Just as in Peter Pan, Director Turnock thinks that if he shuts his eyes and claps his hands 
and wishes ‘real hard,’ everything will turn out okay.” Turnock continued his work undaunted, but 
the incident made an impression. Pullen was a woman on a mission, and she would stop at little 
to see it completed.16  
On September 21, 1987, Thompson unveiled his AIDS package. In his signing message, 
he mentioned his own uncertainty about the scientific facts of the epidemic, declaring, 
It is not easy to sort out which of our concerns are legitimate and which of our actions 
are truly appropriate. Until a time when medical science can tell us more precisely the 
root of this epidemic, we must be firm in our stand to balance our obligation to protect 
the public health while preserving the individual rights of our citizens.17 
 
																																																								
12 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 12.  
13 Kass and Daley, “The AIDS Dilemma.”  
14 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 12.  
15 Qtd in Turnock, “IDPH History,” 13.  
16 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 9.  
17 Qtd. in Turnock, “IDPH History,” 11.  
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He vetoed the most controversial parts of the package—the state registry of AIDS patients, the 
mandatory contact tracing, and the testing of prisoners—and signed the rest, among them, 
MPHT. Thompson supported the MPHT bill because it was free to the state and “people getting 
married ought to know” their HIV status.18 In general, the public, the press, and the IDPH 
supported Thompson’s choices, considering them the best possible in a bad situation.19  
 
Eloping to… Wisconsin? 
Almost immediately after implementation, problems with the bill emerged. As public 
health practitioners expected, the law created logistical difficulties for couples. When a patient 
received an indeterminate or initially positive result, the CDC recommended waiting three to six 
months before repeating testing, to make sure the latency period had passed. For couples with 
fixed wedding dates, this posed a major problem. An Illinois physician, Dr. James Nadler, 
described one of his patients: 
She had no known risk factors and had only one previous sexual partner, several years 
earlier. She was informed of her “neither positive nor negative” result and was advised to 
have the blood redrawn because of a possible “lab error.” With her wedding day less 
than two weeks away, she became emotionally distraught.20 
 
Ultimately, the patient was found to be HIV-negative, but not in time for the wedding, which was 
rescheduled. Nadler accused the MPHT of causing “unwarranted emotional turmoil.”21 David 
Siebert, an AIDS counselor in Chicago, echoed Nadler’s complaints. He reported receiving up to 
100 calls a day from worried couples. He explained:  
All of them have horror stories. The doctor can’t do the test in time or is charging an 
astronomical fee or the bride is here, but the groom is in North Carolina, and they both 
																																																								
18 Tim Franklin, “AIDS Package Sent to Thompson,” Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1987.  
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20 James Nadler, “Letter to the Editor: Premarital Screening for HIV,” Journal of the American Medical 
Association 259.21 (June 1988): 3127.  
21 Ibid. 
	 69 
have to be tested at the same time. People are wondering how they can do it, and we 
don’t know what to tell them.22 
 
Given that Siebert’s job was to counsel at-risk patients about HIV, he was frustrated at the time 
spent reassuring hysterical couples. 
Unlike Siebert, Illinois county clerks had extra time on their hands. After the rush for 
marriage licenses on Dec. 30, 1987, Illinois county clerks found themselves with empty offices. 
Despite couples’ assertions that the marriage law had not affected their decision to marry before 
1988, early statistics suggested the contrary. As 1988 started, marriage rates in Illinois hit a 
thirty-year low.23 Observers hypothesized that the low marriage rate in early 1988 was a mere 
hiccup. It was not. Over the course of 1988, the rate remained sluggish, and Illinois finished the 
year with the lowest marriage rate in the nation, with 6.7 new unions per 1,000 people, a 16% 
decrease from the previous two years, amounting to 20,860 fewer weddings in the state.24 The 
decrease occurred in 97 out of Illinois’ 102 counties.25  
Critics pounced, with one letter in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
commenting, “It is ironic that the Illinois screening program has discouraged many people from 
entering into a legal commitment that fosters a mutually monogamous relationship—a behavior 
that would limit the spread of HIV infection.”26 On this count, critics were wrong. The MPHT law 
did not discourage marriage—it discouraged marriage in Illinois. Because Illinois’ border states 
had not passed similar legislation, many Illinois couples took their nuptials across the state line. 																																																								
22 Isabel Wilkerson, “Pre-Nuptial AIDS Screening Taxes Illinois Health System,” New York Times, Jan. 26, 
1988.  
23 “Marriages, Divorces and Annulments Occurring in Illinois, 1958-2013,” Illinois Department of Public 
Health. The marriage rate may have been the lowest of the century, but I was unable to find accessible 
data older than 1958.  
24 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 13; Petersen and White, “Premarital Screening for Antibodies to Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in the United States,” 1088; McKillip, “The Effect of Mandatory Premarital 
HIV Testing on Marriage,” 652. A similar trend was seen in Louisiana, which passed an identical law; the 
marriage rate decreased by 19% during implementation. 
25 Turnock and Kelly, “Mandatory Premarital Testing for Human Immunodeficiency Virus,” 3416.  
26 Edward Belongia et al., “Reply to Joseph Mercola’s Letter to the Editor,” Journal of the American 
Medical Association 263.15 (April 1990): 2198.  
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County clerks in Wisconsin reported that, throughout 1988, they received eight to ten calls a day 
from Illinois couples asking about marriage licenses. As Nancy Principe, clerk of Kenosha 
County, Wisconsin, explained: “They ask us right away if we have the AIDS test.”27 By April 
1988, Kenosha County clerks had issued 351 marriage licenses to Illinois residents, after 
issuing only 12 during the same period in 1987.28 For the residents of Kenosha, the Illinois 
couples caused much amusement. A minor league baseball team sponsored a mass wedding 
for Illinois couples at one of their games, with eleven couples participating.29 Other nearby 
 
Figure 3: Political cartoon from the time30 
counties like Lake County, Indiana experienced spikes in out-of-stater weddings. After 
performing 167 Illinois weddings in 1987, the Lake County clerk performed 1,008 in 1988.31 
Illinois’ border states all experienced unusually high marriage rates throughout 1988—a 10% 
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29 Edward Belongia et al., “Border Hopping as a Consequence of Premarital HIV Screening: The Kenosha 
Diamond,” JAMA 260.13 (Oct. 7, 1988): 1884.  
30 Unknown author and date; found on “Public Health in Illinois: A Timeline of the Illinois Department of 
Public Health.”  
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	 71 
increase in Indiana, 9% in Wisconsin, and 8% in Missouri. In total, the increase in marriage 
rates in border states almost completely accounted for the reduction in Illinois.32  	
 
Figure 4: Cartoon, early 198933  
Illinois couples did not want to take the HIV test. Observers hypothesized that the cost 
deterred them, but evidence suggested otherwise. The HIV test was expensive, but marriage 
licenses in neighboring states usually cost more than in Illinois ($50 in Wisconsin, as compared 
to $15 in Illinois), in addition to the cost of transportation.34 It is possible that some couples 
moved their weddings as a protest of MPHT, although no research has been done to support 
that explanation. Most research hypothesized that fear was the actual cause, as couples—
usually the male half of the couple—avoided the test from dread of a positive result. 																																																								
32 McKillip, “The Effect of Mandatory Premarital HIV Testing on Marriage,” 652.  
33 Unknown author and date, found in Lyle Peterson, Guthrie Birkhead, and Richard Dicker, “Screening 
for Antibody to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Epidemiology Program Office: Case Studies in Applied Epidemiology, No. 871-703, 2003.   
34 Ibid, 652.  
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Researchers theorized that “a generalized fear of AIDS” had made the illness “such a specter 
that [the test] itself is to be avoided.”35 Engaging the idea of infection invited it to become reality. 
As Denise Thomas, an Illinois bride-to-be, explained, “I just don’t want to take that test. If 
someone wants to be tested, then that’s fine. But me, I don’t want to know if I have AIDS. That’s 
like pushing yourself to the grave.”36  
Illinoisans wanted something done about AIDS, but they did not want to do it 
themselves, perhaps because they disagreed with the methods, perhaps because it required 
them to confront the fact that they could be infected. HIV/AIDS had acquired such stigma that 
the mere chance of a positive diagnosis terrified. As the IDPH had warned, MPHT did not 
encourage HIV testing. Instead, it encouraged people with HIV (or people worried about HIV) to 
flee public health programs and withdraw from the healthcare system. HIV counseling and 
information might have benefited these individuals, but HIV stigma drove them away, forcing 
them to avoid the resources that the IDPH wanted to give them. Rather than learning more 
about HIV and deciding whether or not to get tested, couples reacted to the imposition of MPHT 
by taking their weddings outside of Illinois.  
 
Unanticipated Costs 
 Free testing centers wished that more couples would take their weddings to Wisconsin. 
As demand for HIV tests shot up, independent charities and hospitals (which had been offering 
free or cheap tests) found themselves in trouble. When MPHT passed, legislators specifically 
stated that couples would pay for their own tests. As a result, the IDPH declared that none of 
their tax-subsidized AIDS testing sites would test couples, because that would violate the 
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legislature’s intent.37 Couples swarmed the remaining test facilities.38 Cook County Hospital, the 
biggest public hospital in Chicago, bore the brunt of the burden. After three weeks, the hospital 
board declared that the hospital could not cover the demand.39 The executive director made a 
terse statement, declaring, “We bemoan the fact that the state has given us this new 
requirement, but given us no money to implement it.”40 The hospital stopped offering free HIV 
tests to couples, instead restricting their limited resources to high-risk groups.41 Couples had to 
rely on private physicians, whose price averaged around $70, but could go up to $300 if 
repeated tests were required ($140 and $600 in inflation-adjusted dollars, respectively).42  
Legislators fretted that the lack of cheap HIV tests would make it impossible for poor 
couples to marry, making marriage a class good in Illinois.43 The president of the Cook County 
Board of Commissioners, George Dunne, felt little sympathy, remarking, “The purpose of the 
hospital is to care for the medically indigent, and marriage is not a disease.”44 The IDPH was 
similarly remorseless, noting that MPHT required $200,000 annually to assure testing quality 
control—money that the General Assembly did not provide, and which was cut from other AIDS 
programs.45 The IDPH grated at the flagrant waste of AIDS resources. As one doctor noted, “It’s 
the most expensive public health program going. It’s providing intensive, one-on-one AIDS 
counseling to the people who need it least.”46  
 As the months of implementation wore on, it became obvious how few married people 
needed AIDS counseling. The first positive case did not emerge until late February, earning a 																																																								
37 Jean Latz Griffin, “AIDS Test to Wed is Called a Waste: State Law Labeled Costly, Impractical,” 
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 27, 1987.  
38 Wilkerson, “Pre-Nuptial AIDS Screening Taxes Illinois Health System.”  
39 Ibid.  
40 Tanner and Enstad, “Hospital Refuses AIDS Marriage Test.”  
41 Wilkerson, “Pre-Nuptial AIDS Screening Taxes Illinois Health System.”  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Chad Carlton, “AIDS tracing program needs funds, official says,” Chicago Tribune, June 21, 1988.  
46 Wilkerson, “Pre-Nuptial AIDS Screening Taxes Illinois Health System.” In inflation-adjusted dollars, this 
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major story in the Chicago Sun-Times.47 By July, only seven more appeared. All told, during the 
21 months of implementation, only 56 people tested positive (37 men and 19 women) out of 
287,672 tests administered, for an HIV prevalence of 0.019%, the lowest prevalence found in 
any population tested at that point.48 The number fell well below the IDPH’s already low 
prediction of the prevalence, particularly when it became evident several years later that roughly 
half of the positive tests were false positives.49 Early in implementation, Senator Beverly Fawell, 
the sponsor of MPHT in the Senate, declared: “If we find just 100 people that could have 
possibly infected another 100 people it will have been worth it.”50 Based on the first twenty-one 
months of implementation, finding those 100 people would prove harder than expected. 
 MPHT was an expensive program. The IDPH estimated that in the first six months, test 
fees alone cost $2.5 million.51 Therefore, for each positive test result during that time, Illinois 
couples paid $312,000.52 The IDPH’s estimate of the total cost was a generous one. It did not 
include the additional $200,000 needed to quality control the tests. Moreover, it omitted one 
other major cost: the lost revenue from marriage border-hopping. By 1989, Illinois clerks 
reported that the reduction in marriage license fees cost counties $322,245, and they expected 
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the trend to continue.53 With lost revenue from the struggling Illinois florist, catering, and 
wedding venue businesses included, the MPHT bill cost the state far more than expected. 
 The General Assembly did not want to raise taxes to pay for AIDS, and Thompson 
supported MPHT because it was supposed to be free to the state—no need for tax dollars. It is 
unlikely that MPHT would have passed if Illinois had to provide the funding. The Illinois General 
Assembly and Thompson forgot that a law that preserves tax dollars may still cost money. 
Somebody would have to pay for the program. In this case, MPHT forced Illinois couples to 
spend $5 million in 1988 on HIV tests, effectively doubling the AIDS budget. MPHT may not 
have been a tax, per se, but it was still a mandatory, costly program. For couples, the end result 
was the same. As it became clear how little MPHT accomplished with that money, couples, 
county clerks, and the wedding industries found themselves disinclined to support the program.  
 
Rumblings for Repeal 
 As the problems with MPHT became evident, new allies joined the opposition. Public 
health practitioners and some medical groups remained staunch opponents of the legislation. 
Now, the wedding industries, the Illinois county clerks, and a horde of irritated couples added to 
their numbers, along with some members of the clergy, who resented being forced to become 
ad hoc AIDS counselors for couples seeking to wed.54 Of these groups, the county clerks were 
the most powerful, because they were often well-connected and influential in local politics. 
Without the economic cost of the lost marriage licenses, it is unlikely that county clerks would 
have entered the debate. Once they began to lose revenue, they put substantial pressure on 
legislators.55 The media also attacked the legislation, adding to calls to remove it. By February, 																																																								
53 Turnock, “IDPH History,” 13.   
54 “Premarital AIDS test called burden on clergy,” Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 2, 1988; Turnock, “IDPH 
History,” 13; 85th General Assembly House of Rep. Transcription Debate, May 19, 1988, 39.   
55 Bernard Turnock, interview with author.  
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the New York Times felt sure enough to denounce the MPHT law as “an inglorious example of 
what not to do about AIDS.”56 Even the Chicago Tribune, considered one of the more 
conservative Illinois papers, criticized the legislation, declaring that “any state legislator with a 
gram of common sense” ought to recognize that MPHT was a mistake, “pushed through by soft-
headed politicians eager to do something to fight AIDS but who couldn’t be bothered to learn the 
scientific facts about the disease.”57 Commentators on both sides of the political divide held 
MPHT in contempt.  
 Legislators remained reluctant to repeal. Thompson had asked that legislators wait at 
least a year in order to fully gauge the bill’s effects, and the General Assembly respected his 
request.58 A bigger factor was probably the upcoming 1988 election. Legislators did not want to 
admit a mistake as their voters entered the polls, or to seem like do-nothings on the AIDS 
epidemic. Although some legislators attempted repeals during 1988, none succeeded. The first 
repeal attempt was introduced in April 1988 (and failed by only a single vote) with five more 
attempts that year.59 During repeal attempts, legislators echoed each other’s complaints. 
Representative Ellis Levin (D-Chicago) reported:  
I’ve heard from an awful lot of people in all parts of the state, people on the northwest 
side of Chicago, people downstate that are mad as hell about the additional cost that this 
requirement has imposed. The cost of an individual couple getting married under this 
legislation that we passed last year can be in excess of two hundred and fifty dollars.60 
 
Other legislators recalled that the IDPH had not approved of MPHT, and that they had acted 
against expert advice. They questioned whether the legislation actually helped anyone.61 As the 
repeals continued to fail, opponents of MPHT became pessimistic. Rep. Grace Mary Stern (D-
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Highland Park) commented, “This is, for better or for worse, a very conservative legislature, and 
we have to recognize that they are simply not prepared at this point to repeal that legislation.”62 
As public support for MPHT decreased and legislators took more and more flak from 
their constituents, representatives began to lose patience with Pullen’s continued support for the 
legislation. In response, she and her allies became increasingly defensive. During the second 
repeal attempt, Pullen announced to her colleagues: “I can tell you that there is nothing about 
the AIDS epidemic that has got better during the last year. In fact, it has indeed got worse.” She 
cited an unpublished study that found that 42% of inner-city American teenagers had HIV, and 
blamed the media for spreading false criticism of the bill.63 She argued that the rumors of the 
test’s cost were exaggerated, and that “the cost problem can easily be solved if the Department 
of Public Health in this state wants premarital testing to work. I question whether that is the case 
in terms of our Director of Public Health.”64 Finally, Rep. Stern broke in to observe: 
[Rep. Pullen] gave us a series of alarming statistics from studies which she 
acknowledged were inconclusive and unconfirmed. I find this somewhat anxiety making 
myself, that there should be studies known only to that Representative and that have not 
been published.65 
 
Despite the high tension, the bill stood, to many legislators’ frustration.  
Finally, in early 1989, Thompson recommended repeal. It took still more time, but in May 
1989, Rep. Stern introduced a successful repeal bill. She made a brief speech outlining the 
flaws with the legislation and asking for support. Pullen gave a final impassioned plea on behalf 
of MPHT: 
The Public Health Department of this state, the public health director of this state have 
never supported premarital testing…They have never understood that it is not a matter 
of the numbers of infections found through this procedure, it is a matter of giving life 
saving information to people who are about to enter into a relationship with state 
sanction which will include activity which will transmit the virus if it is present in one of 																																																								
62 Franklin, “House rejects bid to repeal premarital AIDS testing law.” 
63 85th General Assembly House of Rep. Transcription Debate, May 19, 1988, 39-41.  
64 Ibid, 40-1.  
65 Ibid, 43.  
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them…It is said that this law has not been effective because it hasn’t found very many. 
It’s not a matter of how many it’s found, it’s a matter of preventing unknowing 
infections.66 
 
Her entreaties were insufficient. The bill passed the House 63-49.67 In the Senate, legislators 
were more resistant to repeal, perhaps because of the absence of Pullen’s polarizing behavior. 
Senator William Marovitz (D-Chicago) sponsored the repeal, which received an initial vote of 28-
28 and went into postponed consideration.68 During the debate, Senator Jack Schaffer (R-
McHenry) contended: 
I think what we’re proposing here is a step backwards. I think what we’re proposing here 
is to say this disease really isn’t dangerous or important, and that you really shouldn’t 
worry about it, and if we all stick our heads deep enough in the sand, it’ll go away. I don’t 
think it will go away.69 
 
Another senator expressed concern for the babies born with HIV, stating, “I think it’s wrong if we 
repeal it, and I ask you all to keep in mind that children are innocent. If you’re going to have 
children and transmit it, you’re hurting children.”70 Senator Frank Watson (R-Greenville) relayed 
the story of one of his constituents, a “young lady” who contacted him anonymously to thank 
him. He explained, “Because of the AIDS test, it saved her – possibly her life. She was a very 
emotional phone call.”71 Rather than share statistics and scientific studies about MPHT’s 
efficacy or purpose, senators focused on the emotional and moral goals of the legislation, which 
made it much more difficult to defeat. Nonetheless, the repeal passed 32-23.72  
On Sept. 11, 1989, Thompson signed the repeal, formally ending MPHT. He took a 
political risk by refusing to veto and alienated several powerful members of his party, Pullen 
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among them.73 However, Thompson had had his fill of MPHT. He wrote an open letter for the 
occasion, explaining that “the law does not accomplish its purpose and is effectively alienating 
people from our government, health care, and social systems.”74 He had learned “that it is far 
better for us to encourage testing among people who are truly at risk of infection than to 
mandate testing for people who have never engaged in any activity which would cause their 
infection.”75 Illinois couples could marry without a trip to the doctor’s office and were generally 
happier for it. The marriage rate recovered almost immediately.76 On the national level, the 
failure of MPHT in Illinois guaranteed that the federal government would not pursue the policy. 
Public health practitioners savored their vindication, perhaps wishing it came at a lower cost. 
Illinois couples and businesses spent $7.35 million on an AIDS response program that 
accomplished almost nothing.77 Legislators and the public learned that MPHT did not work. It 
remained to be seen if they had learned anything else.  
 
Lessons for Public Health 
For public health officials, MPHT offered plenty of opportunities for bitterness, but also 
some for growth. MPHT and similar incidents made public health officials aware of the new 
demands of their position. Quarantines, diagnostic tests, and the authority of science were no 
longer sufficient to contain disease. Rather than relying on the police powers in their arsenal, 
they had to fashion new talents at advocacy, communication skills, and political smarts.  
MPHT reminded the IDPH and public health workers around the country of the 
importance of politicking to public health. Throughout the incident, the IDPH made political 
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mistakes that cost them heavily. A more politically astute public health department might have 
avoided the “Condom Rag” scandal, which used up most of the IDPH’s political capital and put it 
at a disadvantage for the remainder of the Illinois AIDS response. MPHT also provided lessons 
on working with people outside of the public health profession. While trying to dissuade the 
General Assembly from passing MPHT, the IDPH relied on arguments that focused on 
confidentiality, vulnerable groups, trust-building, and false positives. Many of their critiques were 
grounded in statistics. To the General Assembly, these concerns may have appeared esoteric 
and suspect. They were easily undermined by medical distrust. The IDPH could have better 
focused their argument for their audience. Economic concerns were clearly a priority, but public 
health officials neglected economic arguments during the debate over passing MPHT. 
Emotional appeals also seemed highly effective. One legislator clung to the story of the young 
woman saved from HIV by MPHT; another was struck by the constituents whose HIV tests cost 
more than $250.78 These individual stories worked.  
MPHT also highlighted the importance of collaboration between public health officials 
and their non-medical peers. If the IDPH had sought the assistance of policy experts or 
historians, staffers might have avoided the “Condom Rag” or predicted border-hopping; with 
economists’ help, they could have estimated the financial damage of MPHT. A more 
interdisciplinary perspective might have fostered alliances outside of the public health AIDS 
world, like those that eventually formed with ministers, county clerks, and the wedding 
industries. Interdisciplinary alliances contributed to the repeal of MPHT. With broader thinking 
on the part of the IDPH, they might have prevented MPHT’s passage, too.  
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Public Health and the Media 
 MPHT—and the early AIDS epidemic more broadly—raised important questions about 
the relationship between public health and the media. As discussed, this relationship was an 
imperfect one that contributed to confusion and fear.79 Part of the problem lay with the media’s 
reporting of scientific findings. Journalist James Kinsella described science and medicine as the 
“stepchildren of news organizations, often covered by poorly trained, poorly educated 
reporters.”80 Journalists rarely differentiated between rigorous and less rigorous scientific 
articles, which made it seem as though AIDS research ricocheted from one definite theory to an 
opposing definite theory, all of it equally untrustworthy, adding to confusion and skepticism of 
scientific knowledge.81 Although perhaps accidental, many of the headlines about AIDS seemed 
deliberately fear-mongering, chosen to grab viewers’ attention rather than cover the reality of the 
epidemic.82  
The media bears most of the responsibility for the hysteria and fear incited by its 
coverage, but some of the fault may also lie with public health officials for failing to more fully 
exploit the conduit of the media. Rather than leaving it to the media to translate medical 
research and recommendations, doctors and public health officials could have used the media 
to speak directly to the public. The IDPH could have written a weekly AIDS column for the 
Chicago Tribune, for example. That might have alleviated distrust of the IDPH, because it would 
have provided a “real person” and more nuanced coverage of AIDS in one reliable place. It is 
telling that Surgeon General C. Everett Koop’s AIDS pamphlet had such a positive reception 
with the public.83 Public health departments might have tried following his example, which would 
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have given them more control over the narrative and their own reputation. However, that may 
not have been an option if state governments forbade or restricted communication from the 
public health department, or if page-space in newspapers was limited or expensive.  
The IDPH could have worked with the media to adjust AIDS coverage. At least judging 
by their editorials, Chicago papers were on the IDPH’s side. They protested Thompson’s 
behavior over the “Condom Rag” and the General Assembly’s treatment of Turnock and the 
IDPH. They declared the AIDS bills repressive and ineffective. Once MPHT was implemented, 
they covered its failure fully and faithfully.84 But at the same time, the media’s coverage of the 
AIDS epidemic contributed immensely to HIV stigma and readers’ fear. The same paper that 
protested MPHT might have included an article on the rising prevalence of HIV, a study showing 
that one-third of low-income youth were infected, and a helpful op-ed on how to prepare for 
human extinction. These mixed messages confused readers, who were told in one breath that 
the IDPH had the AIDS situation under control, and in the next that disaster was imminent and 
doctors knew nothing. Forced to determine the truth themselves, readers decided that the IDPH 
was untrustworthy. Perhaps the dismal focus on AIDS was intentional—fear sells. But it might 
have been accidental, driven by the public’s demand for AIDS coverage and the constant supply 
of AIDS news. With more awareness and guidance from the IDPH, newspapers might have 
shifted their coverage, or at least cooled their tone.  
 
Consequences for Credibility 
 At least in public, legislators did not acknowledge their own responsibility for the failure 
of MPHT. Because MPHT failed for reasons that the IDPH had not fully anticipated—and that 
were in some ways under the IDPH’s control—legislators saw little reason to question their 																																																								
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distrust of AIDS experts or their decision to pass the bill. Pullen certainly blamed the IDPH for 
MPHT’s failure, as did many of her allies. Throughout the repeal debates, she stated that MPHT 
could work if the IDPH wanted it to, perhaps imagining that the IDPH could seal the state 
borders and convince private physicians to lower their testing fees.85 The knowledge that MPHT 
identified very few HIV-positive people and wasted limited HIV resources did not faze her; she 
argued that that was not the purpose of MPHT.86 In her eyes, the failure of MPHT was more 
proof that the IDPH did not care about the wellbeing of the people of Illinois, and that she 
needed to intervene. Pullen’s distrust of the IDPH was so strong that it seems unlikely that any 
counterevidence could have changed her mind. 
 Moderate legislators and Thompson responded with sheepishness and stubborn 
insistence that they had done the right thing at the right time. As a group, they seem to have 
agreed on a narrative in which MPHT was a total unknown at the time of passage, and the state 
of Illinois bravely decided to explore it. They believed that Illinois served as a laboratory of 
democracy for MPHT, and its experience provided valuable data for the fight against AIDS.87 
Legislators fixated on border-hopping and the high costs, both because they caused the repeal, 
but also because they were two consequences that the IDPH had not emphasized, and 
therefore provided new knowledge.88 Thompson demonstrated this perspective well in his 
remarks at the repeal, when he declared: “We now have convincing evidence that the disease is 
not prevalent among those getting married.”89 He forgot to mention that epidemiologists had 
already known that HIV was not prevalent among the married population—that was a large part 
of why they opposed MPHT. Part of this was no doubt political calculus—elected officials who 
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accept blame often risk their own office. This new narrative of MPHT allowed them to save face. 
Savvy politicians voted for MPHT when the constituents wanted it, repealed it when the 
constituents hated it, and patted themselves on the back for giving MPHT a try and showing the 
nation that the program had problems.  
Due to moderate legislators’ collective amnesia about the actual circumstances of 
MPHT’s passage, the IDPH did not regain its credibility with them, either. Legislators seemed to 
have forgotten that the IDPH already knew that MPHT would fail.90 For example, Thompson 
wrote in his repeal letter that he had learned that testing and resources should be focused on 
high-risk groups, and that MPHT increased stigma and alienated couples from the public health 
system. He drew the correct conclusion, but omitted the fact that dozens of public health doctors 
had begged him to realize it two years prior.91 MPHT did not hurt the IDPH’s reputation with 
moderate legislators, but it also did not improve it.  
 
Conclusion 
 At MPHT’s repeal, Rep. Barbara Flynn Currie asked her colleagues: “There’s no 
question AIDS is a serious public health problem. What I don’t understand about this General 
Assembly is, why when we face a serious public health problem we don’t listen to the public 
health experts?”92 Her question hit at the insidious nature of medical distrust: it was difficult for 
those who trusted medicine to comprehend others’ distrust, and even more difficult to argue 
against it. Yet those who doubted medicine felt they had good reason, whether it was skepticism 
of public health ethics, concerns about doctors’ abilities, or worries that political opinions tainted 
medical directives. However, an expert response often requires the input of experts, as the 
public and Illinois General Assembly discovered with MPHT. By ignoring the IDPH’s advice, the 																																																								
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state of Illinois spent $7.35 million and made itself a laughingstock for a program that identified 
fewer than 56 HIV-positive people. MPHT added to HIV stigma and discouraged couples from 
seeking help and information about the disease.  
 It was one thing for the public to support MPHT; it was another for the Illinois General 
Assembly to do so. Voters around the country supported MPHT, and given their lack of reliable 
information about HIV and public health theory on the epidemic, their support is 
understandable.93 But the General Assembly had access to a wealth of information about the 
epidemic in Illinois and the IDPH’s recommendations on it. Many of them, given an up-close 
look at MPHT and the public health workers they vilified, acknowledged that the program was 
problematic.94 Yet they voted for it anyway, caving to their constituents’ distrust and fear instead 
of following their own judgment.   
 The debate over whether elected representatives should follow their own judgment or 
that of their constituents goes back to America’s founding, and in some circumstances, 
arguments can be made for both sides. The situation was not so balanced with MPHT. In the 
midst of a deadly epidemic, elected officials had a responsibility to do more than “follow their 
gut,” as Thompson once described his decision-making process on AIDS.95 They had too much 
information to rely solely on instinct, and they owed it to their constituents—particularly their 
HIV-positive, dying constituents—to trust that information.  
Instead, the Illinois General Assembly took the easy way out. For them, MPHT was a 
politically expedient move. For most people with HIV, MPHT was another reminder that their 
lives had less value than those of “innocent,” heterosexual people, and that meaningful help 
from their government was not forthcoming.  
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Conclusion 
Since the time of MPHT, medicine has made remarkable strides against AIDS. In the 
past three decades, scientists and medical researchers have developed dozens of treatments 
for HIV. Today, a person diagnosed with HIV can expect to live into their seventies or eighties if 
they take a single pill each day. Doctors have discovered medicines that make it effectively 
impossible for HIV-positive people to transmit their infection, whether through sexual 
intercourse, from mother to child, or through injection drug use. They have developed therapies 
that uninfected people can take to substantially reduce their risk of contracting HIV.1 People with 
HIV who receive treatment now describe their illness as an “inconvenience”—irritating, but 
manageable.2  
In light of these therapies, public health experts argue that there is no reason for anyone 
to contract or die of HIV. Yet in 2015, the U.S. had 37,600 new HIV infections and 12,333 HIV-
related deaths.  
When discussing HIV, public health practitioners refer to the “cascade of care”—the 
ways that people with HIV slip through the healthcare cracks. Of the 1.2 million Americans living 
with HIV, about 1 million know they are infected. 480,000 of them have been to a doctor to 
discuss their infection. 444,000 of them have been prescribed the medication they need. Only 
360,000—about 30%—have managed to suppress their virus sufficiently to make transmission 
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impossible.3 These numbers are abysmal, and in many cases, lower than those seen in sub-
Saharan Africa, where HIV and poverty are far more severe problems than in this country.4 
Explanations for the disappointing American cascade of care abound. The lack of universal 
health insurance is a major problem and helps to explain why HIV-positive people fail to get 
tested and treated.5 Poverty is another. Despite being the wealthiest country in the world, many 
Americans struggle to make ends meet and find themselves homeless. It is difficult to attend 
doctors’ appointments and adhere to a strict medication schedule without a stable residence.6  
However, AIDS experts highlight one reason as more important than all the rest: stigma.7 
The combination of homophobia, racism, drug criminalization, and the lingering fear of HIV 
create a potent obstacle to identifying and disclosing positive HIV status. Doctors at UNC 
Hospitals tell stories of patients who chose to go blind rather than seek diagnosis and treatment 
of HIV, and others who decide to not take their medication because they are so afraid that their 
family will find it.8 Many people with HIV report that the biggest problem they face is loneliness 
after being shunned by friends and family. They struggle to find romantic partners, because 
most people do not realize that HIV transmission is highly preventable, and they dread revealing 
their HIV status.9  
Stigma is the cause and the consequence of policies like MPHT, and that is why AIDS 
experts protest them. With MPHT, Illinoisans cast doubt on the morality of people with HIV and 																																																								
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the competence of public health practitioners. They implied that people with HIV were not 
acceptable as spouses or as parents, and that if HIV-positive people revealed their status, any 
sane person would leave them. They suggested that HIV-positive individuals’ privacy and 
happiness were of lower priority than other citizens’, because they fell ill with a disease for 
which they were not prepared. They blamed HIV-positive individuals for their own infection. 
Perhaps they did not intend these messages, but that was the result.  
These statements made a powerful impression, and people with HIV understood: hide 
your status at any cost. Turnock identified that consequence early in the epidemic, writing: 
“AIDS and HIV infection are not just another disease…discrimination and social ostracism are 
obstacles as formidable as AIDS itself.”10 Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, Jonathan Mann of 
the World Health Organization, and countless doctors and public health practitioners have made 
similar arguments. Time and comparisons with other countries’ responses have proved them 
right. The disease half of HIV/AIDS has been made curable; the discrimination and social 
ostracism have not.  
AIDS experts recognized the relationship between punitive policy and stigma early in the 
epidemic. They have combatted it at every turn. However, medical distrust continues to inhibit 
their progress. In the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, ordinary Americans and 
their legislators still believe that repressive AIDS measures will work. Despite frequent 
remonstrations from public health organizations, the United States only lifted its ban on HIV-
positive immigration in 2009.11 American sex education is still not as thorough about HIV as 
public health practitioners would like.12 The heavily criticized federal ban on needle exchanges 
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ended in 2015, but restrictions remained in place, and no federal funds have been 
forthcoming.13 These measures, needle exchanges in particular, are more important than ever 
before. In light of the opioid epidemic sweeping across rural America, safe injection drug use 
and HIV prevention strategy have taken on new significance.14  
Unfortunately, there is little reason for optimism about the immediate future of medical 
distrust and HIV in America. Many worry that the new presidential administration has even less 
trust for the medical community than its predecessors. It seems unlikely that President Donald 
Trump will appreciate and respond to the connections between racism, homophobia, income 
inequality, and HIV. His vice president, Mike Pence, was governor of Indiana during the state’s 
largest HIV outbreak. Although he responded appropriately, observers would do well to note that 
the outbreak was exacerbated by his defunding of Planned Parenthood and almost all HIV 
testing and counseling services in the state.15 Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom 
Price, himself a surgeon, is affiliated with a fringe medical group that has suggested that HIV 
does not cause AIDS.16 If Trump and his cabinet follow the precedent of MPHT, it spells doom 
for progress against AIDS in the U.S. Already, AIDS advocacy groups are preparing themselves 
to fight for the Affordable Care Act, which provides health insurance to many people living with 
HIV. They are also ready to defend the Ryan White CARE Act and the Presidential Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief, the two largest funding sources for HIV treatment domestically and 
internationally. Combined, they provide HIV treatment for 12 million people here and abroad. 
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Sources within the Trump administration have suggested that all of these programs may be 
cut.17  
Yet the fight against HIV will continue. Doctors will continue to support and heal their 
ailing patients. Researchers will continue their search for better treatments, and perhaps one 
day a vaccine. Public health workers will continue to advocate for programs that stop infections 
before they happen and find them when they do. Lawyers will continue to defend the rights of 
the infected, and the HIV advocacy community will continue to educate policymakers and the 
public about the needs of people with HIV. People living with HIV will live. We can all do our part 
to fight the injustices that foster HIV infection and to educate ourselves about progress against 
the illness. As Surgeon General Koop declared:  
We are fighting a disease, not people. Those who are already afflicted are sick people 
and need our care as do all sick patients. The country must face this epidemic as a 
unified society. We must prevent the spread of AIDS while at the same time preserving 
our humanity and intimacy.18  
 
HIV has never been merely an illness, and its cure will require—and reward—more than a drug. 
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